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I. INTRODUCTION
On August 16, 1991, a dispute resolution panel, assembled
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),'
ruled that a United States ban on Mexican tuna imports violates
GATT rules.2 The U.S. restrictions were instituted under the
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1948)[hereinafter GATT]. GATT is the
institution that sets the rules for liberalizing international trade. About 120 countries are
now members of GATT or observe GATT rules.
2. United States -Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. DS21/R (Sept. 3,
1991)(report of the panel)[hereinafter GATT Panel Ruling]. The ruling was released to
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Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) 3 and were designed to
end the annual destruction of hundreds of thousands of dolphins
in the nets of tuna fishermen. The panel's decision is in many re-
spects poorly reasoned and inconsistent with the language of
GATT. More importantly, because of its extremely broad wording,
the ruling poses a serious threat not only to international efforts to
protect marine mammals, but also to a whole range of initiatives
safeguarding international environmental resources such as the
ozone layer, ocean fisheries, tropical forests, and endangered spe-
cies. The decision starkly illustrates the pressing need for GATT
reforms that integrate environmental values into the international
trade system.
II. BACKGROUND: THE SLAUGHTER OF DOLPHINS IN TUNA NETS,
THE MARINE MAMMAL PROTECTION ACT, AND THE CHALLENGE OF
PROTECTING THE GLOBAL COMMONS
A. Dolphin Deaths and the Marine Mammal Protection Act
Throughout the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP),4 for
reasons that scientists do not yet understand, herds of dolphins
swim directly over schools of yellowfin tuna. For about the last
thirty years, tuna fishermen have taken advantage of this associa-
tion by locating dolphins as they surface to breathe and setting
purse seine nets5 on the dolphin herds in order to capture the yel-
Mexico and the United States on August 16, 1991. It was released to the remaining GATT
Contracting Parties on September 3, 1991.
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1990). For a discussion of the relevant portions of the Act,
see infra text accompanying notes 12-23.
4. The ETP is the area of the Pacific bounded by 40 degrees north latitude, 40 degrees
south latitude, 160 degrees west longitude, and the western coastlines of the Americas. 16
U.S.C. § 1385(c)(2) (Supp. 1991). It contains an area of five to seven million square miles,
stretching from Southern California to Chile and extending west for nearly three thousand
miles. Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp 964, 966 (N.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd, 929
F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991).
5. The purse seine, a net usually about one mile long and several hundred feet deep, is
held by a motor boat while the fishing vessel unfurls the net to enclose a dolphin herd. The
bottom of the net is closed by tightening a cable, then the top of the net is drawn into the
fishing vessel to capture its contents. GATT Panel Ruling, supra note 2, at 2. Several tech-
niques have been developed to prevent dolphins from being killed, such as "backing down"
the net, where the fishing vessel backs toward the closing purse seine, causing the top to
sink and allowing dolphins an escape route. Caroline E. Coulston, Comment, Flipper
Caught in the Net of Commerce: Reauthorization of the Marine Mammal Protection Act
and Its Effect on Dolphin, 11 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL L. 97, 104-05 (1990).
Despite these techniques, U.S. tuna fishermen continue to kill an average of eight dolphins
each time they set their nets upon a dolphin herd. Jamie Murphy, A Deadly Roundup at
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lowfin swimming below. Fishermen sometimes use explosives and
chase boats to drive the dolphins into the center of their nets so
that the nets can be closed more quickly.'
Millions of dolphins have been killed as a result of this prac-
tice. Dolphins are frequently entangled in the nets and, unable to
reach the surface to breathe, drown. Others are crushed in the tuna
vessel's power block, a mechanism that draws the net into the ves-
sel. Dolphins are also frequently injured while struggling in the
nets. As a result, they later die or, exhausted from struggling in the
tuna net, are attacked by sharks. In the last twenty years the
dolphin population in the ETP has fallen significantly; the popula-
tion of at least one species has fallen below the level needed to
sustain itself.7
Over the last twenty years, Congress responded to this crisis
by enacting increasingly restrictive regulations on tuna fishing
practices. In 1972 Congress passed the MMPA, which sought to
limit the numbers of dolphins killed by American tuna fishermen.'
As a result, the number of dolphins killed by the U.S. tuna fleet
declined markedly." Unfortunately, foreign fleets quickly took up
the slack, increasing their kill to as many as 80,000 dolphins per
Sea: Pressure Mounts to Save the Dolphin By Restricting Tuna Fishing, TIME, Aug. 4,
1986, at 46.
6. See, e.g., Coulston, supra note 5, at 102. For a discussion of the various tuna fishing
methods that result in dolphin deaths, see Kenneth Brower, The Destruction of Dolphins,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1989, at 35; Setting on Dolphin, OCEANS, Sept./Oct. 1988, at 69;
Todd Steiner, The Senseless Slaughter of Marine Mammals, Bus. & Soc'Y REv., Spring
1987, at 18.
7. Sean Kelly, Dolphins: Still Casualties of Tuna Catch, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1991, at
A8. (environmentalists petition for listing of spotted dolphin under U.S. endangered species
act); Coulston, supra note 5, at 102-03; John Godges, Dolphins Hit Rough Seas Again, SI-
ERRA, May/June 1988, at 25.
8. Congress proclaimed an "immediate goal that the incidental kill or incidental serious
injury of marine mammals permitted in the course of commercial fishing operations be re-
duced to insignificant levels approaching a zero mortality and serious injury rate." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1371(a)(2). To attain this goal, the MMPA prohibits the killing or injuring of marine
mammals such as dolphins, except where specifically authorized. 16 U.S.C. § 1371. Cur-
rently, U.S. tuna fishermen may kill up to 20,500 dolphins per year. No more than 250 may
be coastal spotted dolphins and no more than 2,750 may be eastern spinner dolphins. 50
C.F.R. § 216.24(d)(2) (1990).
9. Under the MMPA, according to research compiled by the National Oceanic & Atmo-
spheric Administration, "the annual incidental mortality in the U.S.-flag purse seine fishing
fleet decreased from an estimated 400,000 per year in the early 1970s to less than 20,500
dolphins per year in the 1980s, which is the maximum mortality now allowed under the
MMPA." Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Op-
erations, 55 Fed. Reg. 11,921 (1990) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 216).
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year,10 often in order to supply tuna to the U.S. market. American
boats, in order to avoid MMPA restrictions, simply reflagged under
foreign ship registries.11 To address this problem, Congress in the
1980s twice amended the MMPA, requiring that nations whose
fleets harvest tuna in the ETP have a dolphin protection plan com-
parable to the U.S. program" and that the dolphin mortality rate
for these nations be comparable to that of the U.S. fleet."3 Through
1989, foreign fleets were not allowed to kill more than 2.0 times the
number of dolphins killed by the U.S. fleet during the same pe-
riod.14 By the end of 1990, average dolphin mortality of each na-
tion's fleet could not exceed 1.25 times the U.S. fleet during the
same period. 15
Under the MMPA, these restrictions are enforced two ways.
First, if a nation fails to certify that its tuna fleet has met the com-
parability requirements for dolphin kills, the Secretary of the
Treasury must place an embargo on that nations' imports of tuna
into the United States.' 6 Second, if an importer is still violating
the MMPA requirements six months later, 17 an embargo may be
imposed under the Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen's Protec-
tive Act of 1967,18 which authorizes trade sanctions against coun-
tries that do not abide by international fisheries or wildlife conser-
vation agreements. 9
In addition, to ensure that the dolphin-unsafe tuna embargoed
from the United States is not simply transshipped through other
10. Id.
11. Brower, supra note 6, at 57-58; see also Coulston, supra note 5, at 121.
12. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(i).
13. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii).
14. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii)(II) (Supp. 1991).
15. Id.
16. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2).
17. Six months after a ban on imports of tuna products has been put in place under the
MMPA, the Secretary of Commerce is required to certify this fact to the President. 16
U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(D) (Supp. 1991).
18. 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1988 & Supp. 1991)(as amended).
19. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(4). Once non-compliance is certified, the Pelly Amendment pro-
vides discretionary authority for the President to order a prohibition of imports of marine
products "for such duration as the President determines appropriate and to the extent that
such a prohibition is sanctioned by the [GATT]." Id. While sanctions under the Pelly
Amendment have never actually been imposed, see Gene S. Martin & James W. Brennan,
Enforcing the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling: The Pelly and
Packwood-Magnuson Amendments, 17 DENY. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 293, 298 (1989), it has been
used successfully as a bargaining chip to obtain compliance with such international conser-
vation agreements as the International Whaling Convention and the Convention on Trade
in Endangered Species. Id. at 314-15.
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countries, Congress enacted an "intermediary nations" embargo. 20
This provision is designed to prevent a party from doing indirectly
what it cannot do directly. It requires the government of any na-
tion exporting yellowfin tuna or tuna products to the United States
to certify that it has acted to prohibit importation of tuna from
nations that are subject to a direct embargo under MMPA.21
Finally, in 1990, Congress enacted the Dolphin Protection
Consumer Information Act (DPCIA).22 DPCIA is modestly aimed
only at ensuring that tuna is not falsely labelled as "dolphin-safe."
In order for the tuna to bear the "dolphin-safe" label, tuna import-
ers must certify that their tuna has not been caught in a manner
dangerous to dolphins, which it defines as using either purse seine
nets intentionally set on dolphins in the ETP or high-seas
driftnets.23
Because of these laws, countries whose fishermen continued to
set upon dolphins in the ETP faced losing access to the American
tuna market. Consequently, many of these countries instituted
dolphin-safe alternative fishing methods. For instance, after the
embargo was enforced against them, Panama and Ecuador success-
fully reduced the number of dolphins that were killed by their
tuna fleet by banning the setting of purse seine nets on dolphins
by their nationals.2" However, Mexico, Venezuela, and the Pacific
island nation of Vanuatu did not. After a series of lawsuits by envi-
ronmentalists, the Administration was forced to embargo tuna im-
ports from these nations.25
B. Mexico's Challenge to Dolphin Protection Laws
Believing that U.S. restrictions on imports of dolphin-unsafe
tuna violate GATT, Mexico sought consultations with the United
States in November 1990 as provided for under GATT Article
20. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(C) (Supp. 1991).
21. Id.
22. 16 U.S.C. § 1385 (Supp. 1991).
23. 16 U.S.C. § 1385(d)(1), (2).
24. See 55 Fed. Reg. 38125 (1990) (lifting the embargo on Ecuador); 55 Fed. Reg. 48887
(1990) (lifting the embargo on Panama).
25. See Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd,
929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1990). The lawsuits were brought by Earth Island Institute and the
Marine Mammal Fund, both San Francisco-based environmental groups, after lengthy de-
lays by the Reagan and Bush Administrations in implementing the MMPA's restrictions on
import of dolphin-unsafe tuna. The plaintiffs obtained court orders requiring the Secretary
of the Treasury to enforce these provisions. Id.
[Vol. 23:2
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XXII.26 After the required sixty-day period of consultations failed
to produce a satisfactory resolution, Mexico requested the forma-
tion of a GATT Panel to hear the dispute. 7
The Panel received briefs from the United States and Mexico
and heard arguments in May 1991. Ten other countries and the
European Community also submitted briefs to the Panel. All criti-
cized at least one aspect of the U.S. laws challenged by Mexico."8
As usual, the dispute resolution process was conducted in almost
complete secrecy:29 the public was not allowed to attend the ses-
sions when the Panel heard arguments from the countries in-
volved; none of the information relied upon by the Panel was pub-
licly available; and non-governmental organizations were not
allowed to present evidence concerning the destruction of dol-
phins.30 But for the extraordinary public outcry surrounding this
26. Article XXII provides that any GATT party can seek consultations with another
party concerning "all matters affecting the operation" of the Agreement. GATT, supra note
1, art. XXII.
27. Article XXIII of the GATT provides for matters that cannot be resolved by consul-
tations to be investigated by the Contracting Parties. Article XXIII does not expressly pro-
vide for the creation of dispute resolution panels, but the formation of such panels has
become customary practice. Ivo Van Bael, The GATT Dispute Settlement Procedure, 22 J.
WORLD TRADE 67, 68 (1988). Dispute settlement procedures, and particularly procedures
governing the formation of panels, were formalized (at least temporarily) as part of the mid-
term agreement for the current Uruguay Round GATT negotiations. See Mid-Term Review:
Final Agreement at Geneva, 61 GATT Focus 1, 9-12 (1989). It is likely that dispute resolu-
tion procedures will be substantially modified if the Uruguay Round comes to a successful
conclusion.
The panel formed in response to Mexico's complaint was chaired by Andrks Szepesi,
Hungary's permanent representative to the GATT, and included Rudolph Ramsauer of
Switzerland and Elbio Rosselli of Uruguay. GATT Panel Ruling, supra note 2, at 1, para.
1.2.
28. The submissions of these countries are described in the Panel's report. GATT Panel
Ruling supra note 2, at 26-37, para. 4.1-4.29. Most submissions expressed opposition to the
MMPA's intermediary nations embargo provision.
29. When a panel meets, the nature of its proceedings and the information given to it
are kept strictly confidential. So confidential, in fact, that no official records are kept of its
correspondence or working papers in the GATT registry. Rosine Plank, An Unofficial
Description of How a GATT Panel Works and Does Not, 29 Swiss REV. INT'L COMPETITION
L. 81, 98 (1987).
30. To its credit, the Office of the United States Trade Representative took extraordi-
nary steps to incorporate the viewpoints of environmental groups into its defense of the
MMPA. It met with environmental groups while formulating its submissions, incorporating
information provided by those groups, and provided briefings to interested observers in Ge-
neva following its presentations to the GATT panel. See FIRST SUBMISSION OF THE UNITED
STATES TO THE PANEL ON UNITED STATES MEASURES AFFECTING YELLOWFIN TUNA PRODUCED
BY MEXICO IN THE EASTERN TROPICAL PACIFIC OCEAN (undated) [hereinafter FIRST SUBMISSION
OF THE UNITED STATES]; Letter from Joshua R. Floum, Attorney for Earth Island Institute,
to Jane Earley, Associate General Counsel, National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administra-
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case, the Panel's report would not have been made public until it
was adopted by the GATT Council. The Panel issued its report to
Mexico and the United States on August 16, 1991, and to the re-
maining Contracting Parties on September 3, 1991.31 The report
now awaits formal approval by the full GATT Council.32 Because
of the intense public outcry generated by the decision, Congres-
sional opposition to changing the MMPA, and the delicacy of ne-
gotiations between the United States and Mexico on a prospective
North American Free Trade Agreement, it is unclear when or if the
Panel will submit its ruling to the GATT Council for approval.3 3
tion, U.S. Department of Commerce (Apr. 21, 1991) (offering arguments and evidence to
support MMPA's restrictions on imports of dolphin-unsafe tuna) (on file with the authors).
31. Prior to releasing its final report to all Contracting Parties of the GATT, the panel
releases its report to the parties directly. The parties are given two weeks to examine this
report and discuss possible settlement. If the dispute is not settled within this time, the
report is released to all Contracting Parties and is placed on the agenda for the next GATT
Council meeting. Van Bael, supra note 27, at 62.
32. The Panel Ruling has no binding force on its own. It must be adopted by the
GATT Council for it to acquire full force. However, the GATT Council routinely approves
panel reports that are submitted to it. OLIVIER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE
GATT MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 77 (1985). For a concise overview of the operation of
the GATT dispute settlement panels, see William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT,
11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51 (1987).
33. See Stuart Auerbach, Raising a Roar over a Ruling: Trade Pact Imperils Environ-
mental Laws, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1991, at D1, D6 (Administration officials say Mexico is
unlikely to pursue case in GATT); see also Charles Arden-Clarke, The General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development, at 29 (Re-
vised Nov. 1991); Jessica Mathews, Dolphins, Tuna and Free Trade, WASH. POST, Oct. 18,
1991, at A21 (environmentalist's criticism of the panel decision); Paul Rauber, Trading
Away the Environment, SIERRA, Jan./Feb. 1992, at 24 (predicting an additional 50,000
dolphin deaths per year as a result of the ruling). Current procedures allow parties to defer
submission of a panel report to the GATT Council. Mid-Term Review, supra note 27, at 11-
12. A Mexican trade official recently stated that Mexico may defer submission of the panel
decision to the GATT Council in order to avoid undue friction in the negotiation of the
North American Free Trade Agreement. See Mexico May Concede on Tuna Issue Despite
Belief in Correctness of Stand, U.S.-MExIco FREE TRADE REP., Nov. 4, 1991, at 1.
In addition, Mexico recently announced that it will institute a ten-point dolphin protec-
tion plan for its tuna fleet. Juanita Darling, Tuna Turnabout: Mexico Announces a Dolphin
Protection Plan, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1991, at D6. Although these actions appear to be a
positive step, many environmentalists criticized them as inadequate. Id. Administration offi-
cials have attempted to alter the MMPA in response to the panel ruling but these attempts
appear unlikely to succeed. Key congressional leaders have made clear that there will be no
action on the Administration's proposals. See Alva Senzek & John Maggs, U.S., Mexico
Defuse Tuna Trade Dispute, J. COM., Sept. 13, 1991, at IA; sources cited at infra note 139.
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III. THE PANEL'S INTERPRETATION OF GATT SIGNIFICANTLY
UNDERMINES EFFORTS TO PROTECT THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
A. The MMPA Is Not a Protectionist Measure
The dolphin protection provisions of the MMPA bear none of
the normal earmarks of protectionist legislation. These provisions
do not provide domestic industry with any significant economic ad-
vantage. In fact, U.S. tuna fishermen must meet standards that are
more stringent than importers, thus putting Americans, if any-
thing, at a competitive disadvantage.4 As a result, the U.S. tuna
industry bitterly opposed this legislation." Clearly, the underlying
purpose for the dolphin legislation is not to favor American indus-
try, but to address a very real crisis demanding immediate action
to stem the wanton slaughter of dolphins, to prevent the irreversi-
ble depletion of dolphin populations, and to preserve the integrity
of marine ecosystems.36
Appropriately, the Panel did not find the MMPA to be protec-
tionist. Nonetheless, focusing very narrowly upon the GATT text
and upon trade-related values to the exclusion of other values, the
Panel found that the MMPA violates GATT. Mexico argued that
the MMPA is inconsistent with the general prohibition of quanti-
tative restrictions under Article XI of GATT.37 The United States
responded that the MMPA is not an import quota covered by Arti-
cle XI, but simply a regulation applied in accordance with the re-
quirement of GATT Article III, Paragraph 4, which provides:
34. See infra text accompanying note 67 (outlining comparability requirements in
MMPA).
35. See Coulston, supra note 5, at 120. In fact, the American Tunaboat Association,
intervening on the side of the government, sought to prevent imposition of the tuna em-
bargo in Earth Island Institute, 746 F. Supp. 964. See supra note 25.
36. See 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (congressional statement of intent regarding the depletion of
populations and danger of extinction for certain species of marine mammals and declaration
of policy to protect and conserve marine mammals).
37. GATT Panel Ruling supra note 2, at 7, para. 3.1(a). Article XI, as presently writ-
ten, potentially presents a serious obstacle to environmental protection. Eliza Patterson,
International Trade and the Environment: Institutional Solutions, 21 Envtl L. Rep. (Envtl
L. Inst.) 10,599, 10,601 (Oct. 1991). Article XI, paragraph 1 provides:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether
made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall
be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any
product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or
sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting
party.
GATT, supra note 1, art. XI, para. 1.
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The products of the territory of any contracting party imported
into the territory of any other contracting party shall be ac-
corded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like
products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution, or use."
The GATT Panel determined that Article III allows regulation
of "products" and that Article III "covers only measures affecting
products as such. '3 9 The Panel concluded that the MMPA does
not meet the requirements of Article III since "these regulations
could not be regarded as being applied to tuna products as such
because they would not directly regulate the sale of tuna and could
not possibly affect tuna as a product."4 0 Therefore, the Panel
found, "Article III: 4 obliges the United States to accord treatment
to Mexican tuna no less favourable than that accorded to United
States tuna, whether or not the incidental taking of dolphins by
Mexican vessels corresponds to that of United States vessels."'41
Under this ruling, a GATT party is prohibited from outlawing
or limiting products based upon the manner in which they were
produced, even where that method is banned because of its envi-
ronmental destructiveness. This holding cuts a broad swath
through environmental policy-making by prohibiting, for instance,
distinctions between timber produced in a sustainable manner and
timber produced in an unsustainable manner, 2 or fish caught with
38. GATT, supra note 1, art. III, para. 2.
39. GATT Panel Ruling, supra note 2, at 41, para. 5.14.
40. Id. at 41, paras. 5.14-5.15.
41. Id. at 41-42, para. 5.15 (emphasis added). The GATT panel determined that, be-
cause the MMPA does not fall within Article III, it necessarily falls into Article XI, which
prohibits quantitative restrictions on imports. The Panel concluded that the MMPA vio-
lates Article XI, a conclusion which the United States did not present any argument to
refute. Id. at 42.
42. Tropical deforestation has emerged as one of the most critical environmental issues
of the 1990s, not only for the nations in which those forests are found, but also for the world
community. For instance, forests play a critical role in regulation of the global climate, see
WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, WORLD RESOURCES 1990-91, at 109-10 (1990), and contain a
storehouse of genetic resources which will be essential to maintain the productivity of cur-
rent food crops, as well as to develop new medicines and other extremely important prod-
ucts. See OVERSEAS DEV. COUNCIL, TROPICAL FORESTS: CONSERVATION WITH DEVELOPMENT?,
No. 4, at 3 (1990).
However, tropical forests are disappearing at an alarming rate. It is estimated that be-
tween one and two percent of the world's tropical forests are destroyed each year, although
rates in certain countries are much higher. See Sandra Postel & John C. Ryan, Reforming
Forestry, in WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE, STATE OF THE WORLD 1991, at 74 (Linda Starke ed.,
1991); JUDITH GRADWOHL & RUSSELL GREENBERG, SAVING THE TROPICAL FORESTS 33-37
(Vol. 23:2
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dolphin-killing driftnets and fish caught through more humane
methods. 3
(1988). Recent evidence suggests that the rate of deforestation may be even higher than
previously believed. See WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, supra at 101-05. If these trends con-
tinue, all but the most remote tropical forests will be gone within the next several decades.
See Postel & Ryan, supra at 80; see also Richard L. Williamson, Building the International
Environmental Regime: A Status Report, 21 U. MIAMI INTER-AM L. REV. 679, 709-14 (1990);
Timber Import Ban Sought for Countries Destroying Forests, The Reuter Library Report,
Nov. 29, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library. Deforestation in the tropics is driven by
many causes, including impoverished farmers seeking their own land, cutting of firewood,
mining, and large-scale export-oriented agriculture. See Williamson, supra at 711-12;
WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, supra at 106-07; PUBLIC POLICIES AND THE MISUSE OF FOREST
RESOURCES 15-16 (Robert Repetto & Malcolm Gillis eds., 1988). However, in many areas,
such as Southeast Asia, deforestation is driven primarily by timber companies feeding the
market for tropical hardwoods in the developed countries. See id.; Postel & Ryan, supra at
76-77; see generally George Marshall, The Political Economy of Logging: The Barnett In-
quiry into Corruption in the Papua New Guinea Timber Industry, 20 THE ECOLOGIST' 174
(1990). Only a tiny proportion, far less than one percent, of logging in the tropics is per-
formed on a sustained-yield basis. Postel & Ryan, supra at 79. Further, timber operations
often open the floodgates to other kinds of deforestation by punching roads into virgin for-
ests that are followed by colonists who strip the forest for farmland or pasture. See id. at 79-
80; GRADWOHL & GREENBERG, supra at 39.
Conservationists have begun to respond to the deforestation crisis. For instance, the
International Tropical Timber Organization has attempted to define guidelines for sustaina-
ble production of tropical timber. Postel & Ryan, supra at 91-92. In order to stem the flow
of unsustainably produced timber into developed country markets, conservationists have
begun to examine measures that will encourage sustainable production of timber for export.
For instance, the European Parliament, recognizing that both consumers and producers of
tropical timber must respond to the threats created by tropical deforestation, has an-
nounced plans to restrict unsustainably produced tropical timber imports from Southeast
Asian Nations, with the possibility of a total ban on imports by 1994. Southeast Asia:
ASEAN and EC Foreign Ministers to Talk Timber, Inter Press Service, Feb. 9, 1990, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library. These efforts have apparently been stymied by the Commis-
sion of the European Community, which fears that such limits would violate GATT. EC
Politician Says GATT Is Blocking Environmental Policy, Kyodo News Service, July 1,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library. Less ambitious legislation has been introduced in
the United States that would require labels on tropical timber indicating the country where
this timber was produced. S. 1159, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The Panel's interpretation
of GATT appears to doom such efforts to prevent export-driven destruction of tropical
forests.
43. Driftnets are huge nets, often 20 or more miles long, that are set in the open ocean
and allowed to drift, entangling all but the smallest creatures with which they come in con-
tact. They are favored by the squid fleets of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. Colin James
& Lincoln Kaye, A Catch-All Dilemma, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV., Sept. 1989, at 139, 139-40.
In recent years, as many as 30,000 miles of driftnets have been set each night. Scott McCre-
die, Controversy Travels with Driftnet Fleets, SEA FRONTIERS, Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 13. These
nets are indiscriminate, catching not only squids, but large numbers of non-target species,
including marine mammals, tuna, salmon, and other kinds of economically important fish.
See Douglas M. Johnston, The Driftnetting Problem in the Pacific Ocean: Legal Considera-
tions and Diplomatic Options, 21 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 5, 8-9 (1990); Driftnets: The Kill-
ing Goes On, SEA FRONTIERS, Dec. 1990, at 5.
Driftnets have had a drastic effect on the marine environment. Recent evidence sug-
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The end result is that products whose environmental costs are
externalized will be favored because they are, as a rule, cheaper
than products where the environmental costs of production are in-
ternalized. That is, the Panel interprets GATT so that it systemat-
ically favors products produced in an environmentally destructive
manner.
The Panel's legal reasoning reads into Article III a new re-
quirement-that regulations fall within the Article only if they are
directed at products themselves-that is simply not supported by
the language of that Article. The regulations covered by Article III
include "all laws . . . affecting . . .[the] internal sale, offering for
sale [or] purchase" of products."' The MMPA falls into this cate-
gory because it affects the internal sale of yellowfin tuna by limit-
ing the sale and distribution of tuna caught by setting upon dol-
phins. 5 The Panel's reading of Article III, limiting its application
to laws that regulate "the product as such,"' 46 narrowly constricts
the scope of the Article. Further, there is no question that the
MMPA meets the national treatment requirement of Article III
because U.S. tuna producers are subject to more stringent require-
ments than foreign producers.
gests that driftnets have nearly wiped out the albacore tuna fishery in the South Pacific and,
along with it, the economies of many South Pacific islands. James & Kaye, supra at 139-40.
In response, the United Nations adopted a resolution calling for the end of driftnet
fishing by July 1992 unless scientific evidence can be developed demonstrating that driftnets
can be used in a sustainable fishery. Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and Its Impact
on the Living Marine Resources of the World's Oceans and Seas, U.N. Doc. A/C.2/44/L.81
(Dec. 11, 1987). In 1987, the U.S. Congress passed legislation requiring the President to
certify any nation under the Pelly Amendment that does not adopt a monitoring program to
determine the extent of environmental damage caused by driftnets. Driftnet Impact Moni-
toring, Assessment and Control Act of 1987, 16 U.S.C. § 1822 (Supp. 1991). Congress re-
cently amended this act, instructing the Secretary of Commerce to certify to the President
information showing any nation under the Pelly Amendment that does not comply with the
United Nations resolution. 16 U.S.C. § 1826(f) (Supp. 1991).
Japan initially threatened to seek redress through GATT if any trade sanctions were
imposed upon it because of its driftnetting practices. Japan Prepares to Fight to Retain
Driftnet Fleet Against US Opposition, J. COM., Nov. 5, 1991, at 5A. However, Japan has
now agreed to end driftnetting by the end of 1992. Tom Kenworthy, Japan to End Drift
Net Fishing in Bow to Worldwide Pressure, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 1991, at A3. It is hoped
that other driftnetting nations will follow suit. Id.
44. GATT, supra note 1, art. III, para. 2.
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1371; 50 C.F.R. Part 216 (1990).
46. GATT Panel Ruling, supra note 2, at 41, para. 5.14.
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B. The Pelly Amendment
The Panel declined to decide the legality of the Pelly Amend-
ment under GATT on the grounds that it had not been imple-
mented administratively and that it was possible for the Amend-
ment to be implemented in a manner consistent with GATT. 7
However, given the Panel's very narrow reading of Article XX, as
discussed below, it is difficult to conceive of any reasonable admin-
istrative interpretation of the Pelly Amendment that would not
run afoul of the Panel's ruling.
C. GATT Article XX Exceptions
If a particular trade restriction violates the general principles
of GATT, it may nonetheless be valid if it falls within one of the
exceptions contained in Article XX.48 For instance, the United
States prohibits imports of fresh beef from tropical countries
where hoof-and-mouth disease occurs in order to prevent the
spread of the disease into previously-uninfected American cattle.49
This import restriction, although in conflict with GATT's general
prohibition against import bans, is nonetheless allowable because,
under Article XX(b), a nation may impose trade restrictions
designed to protect the life and health of animals such as beef cat-
tle." Other Article XX exceptions allow trade restrictions in order
to attain specific objectives ranging from protection of national
47. Id. at 42-43, paras. 5.20-5.21.
48. The relevant provisions of Article XX provide:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination be-
tween countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not incon-
sistent with the provisions of this Agreement ...
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption;
GATT, supra note 1, art. XX.
49. 9 C.F.R. § 94.1 (1991).
50. See Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article
XX, 25 J. WORLD TRADE 37, 40 (1991).
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treasures to prevention of prison labor.51 The United States de-
fended the MMPA from Mexico's attacks by arguing that it falls
within two Article XX exceptions: Article XX(b), which allows
trade restrictions "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life
or health, ' 52 and Article XX(g), excepting trade restrictions "relat-
ing to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on do-
mestic production or consumption." 53
1. Article XX(b)
The GATT Panel premised its conclusion that the MMPA
does not fall within Article XX(b) on three major propositions.
First, the Panel reasoned that Article XX(b) applies only to mea-
sures taken to protect human, animal or plant life or health within
the jurisdiction of a particular GATT party. Thus, the MMPA,
which aims to protect dolphins outside the jurisdiction of the
United States, does not fall within Article XX(b).5
Nothing in the language of Article XX(b) requires or even im-
plies such a limitation. Article XX(b) allows trade restrictions for
the protection of human, animal or plant life with no stated limita-
tion that those living beings must be within the boundaries of the
country enacting the restrictions.
In a break from the rigid textualists approach, on which it re-
lies for most of its decision, the Panel conclusion relied not upon
the language of XX(b) but upon a cursory examination of the
drafting history of that Article. However, in so doing, the Panel
clearly misreads the history of Article XX(b). An examination of
the circumstances surrounding the original GATT negotiations in
the late 1940s, when Article XX(b) was agreed upon, reveals the
extent of the Panel's error. Many of the countries that negotiated
the GATT at that time had in place laws designed to protect
human health and conserve wildlife beyond their borders. These
included such multilateral efforts as an international ban on trade
in matches made with white phosphorus, a chemical that causes a
51. GATT, supra note 1, art. XX. If Article XX exceptions such as these are read as
narrowly as the Panel has read Articles XX(b) and (g), the ability of the GATT Contracting
Parties to take measures in support of these non-environmental objectives could be severely
undermined.
52. Id. art. XX(b).
53. Id. art. XX(g).
54. GATT Panel Ruling, supra note 2, at 44-45, paras. 5.24-5.25.
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severe occupational disease, 55 and international conventions to pro-
tect, seals, sea otters," and migratory birds. 7 Similarly, many
countries unilaterally enacted trade measures to protect ocean fish-
eries, 58 wildlife,59 and wild birds.60 The United States, the drafter
of the language that ultimately became Article XX(b), believed
that these conservation measures would be included within the
scope of Article XX(b).6
Precisely because the meaning of Article XX(b) had already
been agreed upon, there was very little discussion of that section at
the GATT negotiations. In fact, the language finally incorporated
into Article XX(b) had been discussed at length in previous trade
negotiations, particularly in connection with the first comprehen-
sive multilateral trade negotiations in 1927.2 These earlier negoti-
ations clearly established that laws to "protect human, animal or
plant life or health" included measures to prevent the "degenera-
tion or extinction" of animals, as well as to protect animals and
plants from imported pests and diseases.6 s
The Panel's conclusion is based upon changes made by the
drafters in the proposed language for Article XX(b). Although the
55. Convention respecting the Prohibition of the Use of White (Yellow) Phosphorus in
the Manufacture of Matches, Sept. 26, 1906, 203 Consol. T.S. 12.
56. Convention between the United States and other Powers providing for the preser-
vation and protection of fur seals, July 7, 1911, 37 Stat. 1542.
57. Convention for the protection of migratory birds, Aug. 16, 1916, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 39
Stat. 1702. GATT was originally conceived at the Bretton Woods conference, just after
World War II, as the working mandate of the proposed International Trade Organization
(ITO), which would have been part of the United Nations system. Dennis Thompson,
GATT's Fortieth Birthday, 22 J. WORLD TRADE 5 (1988). The GATT was intended to codify
the tariff reductions that were expected to be produced by the ITO when it came into exis-
tence. However, the U.S. Congress refused to approve American membership in the ITO.
The GATT is an executive agreement, and not a treaty. William J. Davey, An Overview of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in HANDBOOK OF GATT DISPUTE SErLEMENT
7, 8-9 (1991).
58. Act of June 6, 1924, ch. 621, 44 Stat. 752-53.
59. Act of May 25, 1900, ch. 553, 31 Stat. 187 (prohibits interstate transportation of
game).
60. Act to reduce tariff duties and to provide revenue for the government and for other
purposes, § 347, 38 Stat. 114, 148 (1913).
61. Charnovitz, supra note 50, at 44-45.
62. See International Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions
and Restrictions, Nov. 8, 1927, art. IV(4), 97 L.N.T.S. 393, 405 (1927) [hereinafter Interna-
tional Convention]. This Convention, although ratified by a number of countries, ultimately
failed. Charnovitz, supra note 50, at 41. The language from previous negotiations such as
these was incorporated in Article XX(b). The GATT negotiators considered it "almost boil-
erplate." Id. at 44.
63. See International Convention, supra note 62, at 427.
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original U.S.-British proposal for Article XX(b) was the same as
the current language, at one point during the negotiations it was
proposed that the language be tightened to allow trade restrictions
"Iflor the purpose of protecting human, animal or plant life or
health, if corresponding domestic safeguards under similar condi-
tions exist in the importing country."' However, the proposal was
rejected and the underscored phrase was not included in the final
version of Article XX(b). From this, the Panel concluded that "the
record indicates that the concerns of the drafters of Article XX(b)
focused on the use of sanitary measures to safeguard the life or
health of humans, animals or plants within the jurisdiction of the
importing country." 5
The drafters deleted the underlined phrase not because Arti-
cle XX(b) was intended to be limited to domestic jurisdiction.
Rather, that language was dropped because it was considered con-
fusing and, when read in conjunction with the preamble of Article
XX, redundant."' Further, nothing in the deleted phrase necessa-
rily limits the scope of the Article XX(b) exception to domestic
resources. Instead, the excluded language would have required only
that foreign producers be subject to safeguards "corresponding to"
the regulations imposed on domestic producers. Had this language
remained in the final version, the MMPA would satisfy this re-
quirement because the safeguards for dolphins imposed upon for-
eign producers under the MMPA not only correspond to the safe-
guards imposed on domestic producers but also hold U.S.
fishermen to even more stringent restrictions than foreign fleets
with regard to the average rate of incidental takings of marine
mammals.6 7 So, the Panel's reliance on the drafting history is
64. See GATT Panel Ruling, supra note 2, at 45, para. 5.26.
65. GATT Panel Ruling, supra note 2, at 45.
66. Charnovitz, supra note 50, at 44. The Preamble is reproduced, in pertinent part, at
note 48, supra.
67. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. The MMPA requires that the dolphin
conservation programs adopted by foreign fishing fleets include "such prohibitions against
encircling pure schools of species of marine mammals, conducting sundown sets, and other
activities as are made applicable to United States vessels." 16 U.S.C. § 1371(c)(2)(B)(ii)(I)
(emphasis added); see also Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals Incidental to Com-
mercial Fishing Operations, 55 Fed. Reg. 11,921 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. Part 216) (Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's defense and explanation of comparability
standards for foreign fleets)[hereinafter Taking of Marine Mammals].
Even if the Panel correctly divined the intent of Article XX(b)'s drafters, the Panel
assumes that those drafters intended the Article to be static, unable to change over time
with changes in the perceived need for and appropriateness of measures to protect living




Even if the clause included in the earlier draft of Article
XX(b) could be interpreted to restrict that section to domestic
concerns, the fact that the language was dropped from the final
version of Article XX(b) suggests that the drafters did not intend
the Article to be so limited. The Panel, however, improperly drew
precisely the opposite inference.
Nor is the Panel's conclusion that Article XX(b) was intended
to be limited to sanitary measures supported by the plain language
of the Article. If the drafters of Article XX(b) had intended it to
apply only to sanitary rules, they could have referred specifically to
"sanitary" measures, a term having been used in many treaties and
with a well understood meaning within international trade par-
lance at the time of the initial GATT negotiations."
The second proposition upon which the Panel based its con-
clusion regarding Article XX(b) was the policy argument that a
broader interpretation of the Article could undermine the interna-
tional trade system:
The Panel considered that if the broad interpretation of Article
XX(b) suggested by the United States were accepted, each con-
tracting party could unilaterally determine the life or health
protection policies from which other contracting parties could
not deviate without jeopardizing their rights under the General
Agreement. The General Agreement would then no longer con-
stitute a multilateral framework for trade among all contracting
parties but would provide legal security only in respect of trade
between a limited number of contracting parties with identical
internal regulations.6 9
original drafters intended it to be flexible in order to cover a variety of situations that they
could not foresee.
68. See Charnovitz, supra note 50, at 40. Under the current Uruguay Round of GATT
negotiations, the GATT parties are nearing agreement on a code governing the use of sani-
tary regulations. "Sanitary and phytosanitary measures" is precisely defined in the most
recent draft agreement and deals with such issues as the spread of disease, pests, and dis-
ease-carrying organisms as well as contaminants and toxins in food. See Draft Text on San-
itary and Phytosanitary Measures, MTN.GNG/NG5/WGSP/7, Nov. 20, 1990, at 12 [herein-
after Text on Measures]. It is apparent from the agreement that the Uruguay Round
negotiators consider sanitary and phytosanitary measures to be only a subset of the mea-
sures covered under Article XX(b). See Letter from Eric Christensen, Attorney for Commu-
nity Nutrition Institute, to James T. Grueff, Uruguay Round Group for Health-Related Bar-
riers to Agricultural Trade, Foreign Agriculture Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture 2
(May 23, 1991)(on file with the authors).
69. GATT Panel Ruling, supra note 2, at 45, para. 5.27.
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Notably, the Panel gave great weight to trade policy arguments
while giving short shrift to other important international values in-
cluding protection of the global commons. In any event, this
parade of horribles is tremendously farfetched. First, even if Arti-
cle XX(b) is read to allow protection of extraterritorial resources, a
party enacting such protections must meet the requirements of Ar-
ticle XX's preamble, which states that the trade measures must
not "constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
• ..or a disguised restriction on international trade ... ."" Thus,
a country cannot use Article XX measures for protectionist pur-
poses, even if the measures are intended to protect resources
outside that country. The focus, instead, should be on whether the
trade measure is protectionist or serves a legitimate government
purpose (such as conservation), not on whether the trade measure
meets the kind of mechanical legal tests employed by the Panel.
Second, laws such as the MMPA, through which the United
States imposes the same or similar environmental requirements on
importers and domestic producers, do not dictate domestic U.S.
environmental standards to other countries. They merely set stan-
dards for access to U.S. markets that all producers must meet,
whether foreign or domestic when engaging in an activity that
strongly impacts the global commons. Exporters and other import-
ers remain free to follow whatever standards they desire for their
domestic production, which is still the vast majority of production
even in countries highly dependent upon exports to the United
States." These standards are not unlike thousands of other regula-
tory, technical, and social standards and norms that importers
must meet when manufacturing items for the U.S. market or any
70. GATT, supra note 1, art. XX. While the language concerning "disguised restric-
tions on international trade" was intended as a check on abuses of sanitary regulations, it
has been interpreted extremely narrowly by recent GATT Panels, so that a measure is con-
sidered "disguised" only if it has never been publicly announced. United
States-Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, GATT Doc. L/
5198 (Feb. 22, 1982) in BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS [Hereinafter BISD]
29th Supp. 91, 108, para. 4.8 (1982); United States-Imports of Certain Automotive Spring
Assemblies, GATT Doc. L/5333 (May 26, 1983) in BISD 30th Supp. 107, 125, para. 56
(1983). This phrase should be reinterpreted so that protectionist measures that are falsely
justified by a purpose permissible under Article XX are considered to be disguised restric-
tions, even if they are publicly announced. See Charnovitz, supra note 50, at 47-48.
71. In 1989, Mexico's tuna exports to the United States comprised only 17.1% of the
total, while 20.5% of exports went to Japan and 48.8% went to Italy. In 1990, Mexico's tuna
exports to the U.S. comprised only 3% of its sales. David Clark Scott, US Tuna Ban May
Snag Trade Talks with Mexico, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 7, 1990, at 6.
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other market." For instance, countries importing cars into the
United States must conform their products to the American mar-
ket through measures including printing instructions and labels in
English, calibrating instruments and gauges in English rather than
metric units, installing devices required by American consumer
protection laws, and, in some cases, moving the controls from the
right to the left side of the car. There is no reason to believe that a
few additional changes in the manufacturing process to meet envi-
ronmental requirements would doom the exporter. The fact that
American producers have to meet the same standards, and thus
bear the associated costs, belies any claim that such standards
would hinder foreign production or exports.
Third, the Panel's conclusion suggests that the United States
should have little or no control over imports into its markets, even
if those imports are resulting in environmental devastation all over
the world. In fact, the demand for imports in the industrialized
countries contributes heavily to a variety of global environmental
problems, ranging from destruction of tropical forests 73 to oblitera-
tion of species such as elephants for luxury items like ivory74 to
over-fishing of a wide variety of ocean species . 5 The Panel decision
hamstrings U.S. environmental policy and that of other environ-
mentally-minded importing countries by severely restricting the
ability of those governments to control the flow of environmentally
destructive products into their domestic markets. Thus, the sover-
eignty of GATT parties to regulate their markets is fundamentally
eroded.
The third proposition upon which the Panel based its inter-
72. The United States has about 89,000 distinct technical standards. Presentation of
Maureen Breitenberg, National Institute of Technical Standards, U.S. Department of Com-
merce, to U.S. Environmental Prectection Agency, International Environment Advisory
Committee, (Wash. D.C., Oct. 23, 1990). Other industrialized nations have between 6,000
and 88,000 standards. Id.
73. See George Marshall, The Political Economy of Logging: The Barnett Inquiry into
Corruption in the Papua New Guinea Timber Industry, 20 THE ECOLOGIST 174 (1990)
(Papua New Guinea government inquiry documenting fraud, corruption and massive defor-
estation driven by timber companies from industrialized nations).
74. See J. COM., Sept. 16, 1991, at 5A (concerning ban on trade in ivory aimed at saving
African elephants from extinction).
75. See Lawrence Ingrassia, Dead in the Water: Overfishing Threatens to Wipe Out
Species and Crush Industry, WALL ST. J., July 16, 1991, at Al (concerning depletion of
ocean fisheries by high-seas driftnets); Richard Palmer & Andrew Yates, Seas Turn to
Marine Deserts as Fishermen Cast a 'Wall of Death', SUNDAY TIMEs, June 2, 1991, at Home
News section (same); Commercial Fisheries Showed Gains in 1990, N.Y. TIMEs, July 16,
1991, at A16 (concerning depletion of ocean fisheries).
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pretation of Article XX(b) is that, even if that section were inter-
preted to allow the protection of resources outside national bound-
aries, the MMPA still does not fall within this exception. It
reasoned that the MMPA provisions are not "necessary," as re-
quired under Article XX(b), because the United States could have
negotiated "international cooperative arrangements" with Mexico
to protect dolphins.76 This reasoning demonstrates the danger of
the very narrow interpretation that the term "necessary" has been
given in previous GATT rulings. One panel held that a law is "nec-
essary" under Article XX(b) only if no other alternative measures
are available to achieve the same result.7 In the present case, the
Panel, relying on this reasoning, suggested that the United States
could have pursued multilateral arrangements to preserve dolphins
without examining the practicality of this strategy. Apparently un-
known to the Panel, the United States has pursued dolphin conser-
vation through the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Convention
(IATTC)7 8 but, at least partly because of Mexico's refusal to par-
ticipate, this effort has largely failed to curtail the continuing
slaughter of dolphins.7 9 So, if GATT Panels continue to define
"necessary" in this very restrictive way, it will be difficult or im-
possible for contracting parties to justify any particular environ-
mental measure on the grounds that plausible alternative measures
will, arguably, always be available. This is particularly true if
GATT Panels like this one fail to examine whether those alterna-
tives are practicable or effective.80
The Panel further noted that even if the import restriction
were the only option reasonably available to the United States, the
particular measure chosen could not be considered to be "neces-
sary" within the meaning of Article XX(b).s1 The MMPA sets the
76. GATT Panel Ruling, supra note 2, at 46.
77. Thailand-Restrictions on Importation and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, GATT
Doec. DS10/R, paras. 74, 81 (1990). See also Charnovitz, supra note 50, at 48-49.
78. Convention Between the United States of America and the Republic of Costa Rica
for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, May 31, 1949, 1
U.S.T. 230, T.I.A.S. No. 2044, 80 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Mar. 3, 1950)[hereinafter
IATTC Convention].
79. Contrary to the Panel's view, "in this case, the United States is not taking a maver-
ick, unilateral action opposed by the rest of the world." Editorial, Tuna Trade Troubles, J.
COM., Sept. 11, 1991, at 8A. See also infra text accompanying notes 113-18 (concerning at-
tempts by the IATTC, at the urging of the United States, to adopt a dolphin conservation
program).
80. For a critique of the GATT panel's interpretation of "necessary," see Charnovitz,
supra note 50, at 49-50.
81. GATT Panel Ruling, supra note 2, at 46, para. 5.28.
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maximum incidental dolphin taking rate that foreign fleets must
meet during a particular period to export tuna to the U.S. to the
taking rate actually recorded for U.S. fishing vessels during the
same period.8 2 According to the Panel, Mexican fleets could not
know whether, at any given time, their harvesting conformed to
MMPA standards, so the U.S. could not claim that this limitation
on trade was necessary." The Panel's logic is tenuous at best.
While the MMPA standards should be more accessible to export-
ers,84 this does not mean that the law is unnecessary. It simply
means that it is difficult for importers to determine whether they
comply with the MMPA.8 5 Changes in the law would quickly rem-
edy these relatively minor flaws.
2. Article XX(g)
The United States also defended the MMPA as a conservation
measure falling within Article XX(g), which allows import restric-
tions aimed at "conservation of exhaustible natural resources."88
The Panel concluded that Article XX(g)'s requirement that import
restrictions be taken "'in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption'" does not allow restrictions to protect
resources, like dolphins, that lie outside the jurisdiction of the
country enacting those restrictions.8 7
This conclusion belies the plain language of Article XX(g),
which allows conservation restrictions if they are coupled with "re-
82. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1985 & Supp. 1991).
83. GATT Panel Ruling, supra note 2, at 46, para. 5.28.
84. In the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) discussion of
comments received in response to its proposed regulations implementing the comparability
requirements, it admitted that the ability of a foreign nation "to achieve a comparable mor-
tality rate on the schedule required remains questionable." Taking of Marine Mammals,
supra note 67, at 11,923. If the GATT panel had limited its holding to this narrow ground,
it is unlikely that it would have raised a crisis in confidence in the capacity of GATT panels
to handle environmental issues and would almost certainly have been quickly settled. Fur-
ther, only minor modification of the MMPA would have brought it in compliance with such
a ruling.
85. GATT imposes transparency standards on Contracting Parties through measures
such as GATT Article X and the GATT "Standards Code." See Technical Barriers to
Trade, MTN.GNC/RM/W/7, Oct. 31, 1991 (containing draft Uruguay Round agreement on
technical barriers to trade). These measures require that a government publish proposed
trade regulations and allow comments on those regulations by importers. Id. art. 2.9.
While technically not violating these requirements, the MMPA does seem to come up
short in being accessible and easily understood by importers.
86. GATT Panel Ruling, supra note 2, at 46, para. 5.31.
87. Id. at 46-47, para. 5.31.
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strictions on domestic production or consumption."8 8 The presence
of the disjunctive "or" suggests that limits on consumption alone
are sufficient to protect a conservation program under Article
XX(g). The language of this section in no way suggests that these
restrictions need be limited to domestic resources. To the contrary,
because domestic consumption restrictions alone are sufficient to
invoke the Article, this language implies that production need not
be in the control of the country enacting the conservation program.
In other words, consumption restrictions may be placed on re-
sources produced at home or abroad. This reading comports with
not only the plain language of Article XX(g) but also with the
need to conserve critical international resources ranging from
ocean fisheries to forests. Plainly, the MMPA contains restrictions
on domestic consumption of dolphin-unsafe tuna and the Act's
tuna embargo provisions are designed primarily to ensure that
these restrictions effectively protect and conserve dolphins. Thus,
the MMPA falls squarely within Article XX(g)'s requirement that
domestic controls on production or consumption be enacted.
The Panel's conclusion is also at odds with the drafting his-
tory of Article XX(g). At the time the original GATT negotiators
agreed to Article XX(g), many measures aimed at the conservation
of biological resources, including international resources like fisher-
ies, had been enacted. 9 It was understood that Article XX(g) in-
cluded such international resources.9 0 For instance, considerable
debate existed over whether to include specific wording related to
fisheries conservation in Article XX(g), but this language was not
used because the negotiators believed that the "conservation of ex-
haustible natural resources" language implicitly contained such
measures.
9 1
As with its analysis of Article XX(b), the Panel concluded
that reading Article XX(g) to include extraterritorial resources
would allow nations to "unilaterally determine the conservation
policies from which other contracting parties could not deviate
without jeopardizing their rights under the General Agreement."92
This argument is even more inexplicable in the context of Article
XX(g) than in the context of Article XX(b). Article XX(g) re-
88. GATT, supra note 1, art. XX(g) (emphasis added).
89. U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/147, at 29-30.
90. U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/B/SR/27, at 14.
91. Charnovitz, supra note 50, at 46-47.
92. GATT Panel Ruling, supra note 2, at 47.
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quires that a domestic conservation program be in place for the
imposition of conservation-oriented trade restrictions. This re-
quirement, along with the limits prescribed in the preamble of Ar-
ticle XX requiring that the trade measures not be discriminatory
or a disguised trade barrier, effectively prevents protectionism in
the guise of conservation measures.
By contrast, under the Panel Ruling, a country can prevent its
own consumers from buying products that endanger environmental
resources outside its jurisdiction. This holding severely restricts
the ability of industrialized countries to prevent potentially disas-
trous phenomena such as global warming, ozone depletion, and de-
struction of ocean fisheries, all of which are caused at least in part
by consumer demand in these countries.9 3
Finally, quoting a previous Panel's decision, the Panel found
that the MMPA does not "relat[e] to the conservation of exhaus-
tible natural resources" under the terms of Article XX(g) because
importers will find it difficult to determine if they comply with the
MMPA's restrictions on dolphin destruction.9 4 As with its reason-
ing under Article XX(b), the Panel's ruling here is misapplied. A
law's lack of transparency to importers is no basis on which to con-
clude that it is not related to a goal as legitimate as conservation.
D. MMPA's Intermediary Embargo
The Panel also struck down the intermediary nations embargo
of the MMPA, which prevents third countries that buy dolphin-
unsafe tuna from producers like Mexico from selling tuna in the
United States." The Panel concluded that, even though American
fishermen must meet more restrictive requirements than interme-
diary tuna shippers, the intermediary embargo does not meet the
national treatment requirements of Article III because it is "not
93. See, e.g., ANN DAVISON, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF CONSUMER UNIONS, BUYING
THE EARTH 1-2 (1991); Christopher Flavin, Slowing Global Warming, in WORLDWATCH INSTI-
TUTE, STATE OF THE WORLD 1990, at 17-22 (Linda Starke ed., 1990); see also supra notes 73-
75 and accompanying text.
94. GATT Panel Ruling, supra note 2, at 47. The Panel relied upon a previous panel's
findings that a measure "would be considered as 'relating to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources' within the meaning of Article XX(g) only if it was primarily aimed at
such conservation." Id. (citing Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Her-
ring and Salmon, GATT Doc. 46,268 (Mar. 22, 1988) in BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED
DOCUMENTS, 35 Supp. 98 (1988)). This interpretation of the "relating to" language may se-
verely impair efforts to preserve the environment. See Charnovitz, supra note 50, at 50-51.
95. GATT Panel Ruling, supra note 2, at 48-49, paras. 5.35-5.40.
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applied to tuna as a product."96 Because the embargo did not fall
within the scope of Article III, the Panel found that it was a quan-
titative restriction inconsistent with Article XI.e7 As with its previ-
ous discussion of Article III, the Panel's reasoning is intrinsically
flawed.
The United States argued that the intermediary embargo was
exempt from GATT under Article XX(d). That section allows
trade restrictions that are "necessary to secure compliance with
laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with" GATT.9 The
Panel held that, because the primary boycott of Mexican tuna was
illegal under GATT, the intermediary embargo could not be justi-
fied under Article XX(d). ee As discussed above, however, the em-
bargo of Mexican tuna can properly be seen as consistent with
GATT because it is necessary to ensure that the primary embargo
is not circumvented by fishermen who simply transship dolphin-
unsafe tuna through countries that are not directly embargoed
under the MMPA.
E. Dolphin-Safe Labelling Requirements
With respect to the dolphin-safe labelling provisions of
DPCIA,'00 Mexico argued that both Article IX, which regulates the
use of marks of origin, and Article I, which prohibits discrimina-
tion against imports, violate GATT. The Panel rejected these con-
tentions and rightly determined that the DPCIA does not violate
these provisions.10'
However, its reasoning provides some basis for concern. The
Panel reasoned that the dolphin-safe labelling provisions are not
discriminatory because they "did not make the right to sell tuna or
tuna products, nor the access to a government-conferred advantage
affecting the sale of tuna or tuna products, conditional upon the
96. Id. at 48, para. 5.35.
97. Id. Article XI disallows any prohibitions or restrictions other than "duties, taxes or
other charges" to be instituted or maintained by a contracting party on the importation of
any product from the territory of another contracting party. GATT, supra note 1, art. XI.
98. GATT, supra note 1, art. XX(d).
99. GATT Panel Ruling, supra note 2, at 48-49, paras. 5.39-5.40. The Panel also con-
cluded that the intermediate embargo is not justified under Article XX(b) or XX(g), relying
on its previous reasoning for both sections. Id. at 48, para 5.38. As discussed above, its
reasoning with respect to these provisions is seriously flawed.
100. 16 U.S.C. § 1385 (Supp. 1991). See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
101. See GATT Panel Ruling, supra note 2, at 49-50, paras. 5.41-5.44.
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use of tuna harvesting methods. ' 10 2 This language illustrates the
Panel's previous conclusion that a government cannot establish
any measure that would confer an advantage upon producers using
environmentally sensitive production methods.103 For instance, if
the United States imposed an excise tax upon dolphin-unsafe tuna
in order to prevent this tuna from undercutting dolphin-safe pro-
ducers through lower prices, the tax would provide "a government-
conferred advantage" to dolphin-safe producers in violation of
GATT as interpreted by the Panel.10 4 This example underscores
the shackles that the Panel decision places upon governments at-
tempting to devise policies that encourage internalization of envi-
ronmental costs and support environmentally sustainable produc-
tion methods.
F. The Panel's Decision Could Seriously Undermine Inter-
national Environmental Protection
In an effort to limit the impact of its decision, the Panel stated
that:
[A]doption of [the Panel's] report would affect neither the rights
of individual contracting parties to pursue their internal envi-
ronmental policies and to co-operate with one another in harmo-
nizing such policies, nor the right of the CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES acting jointly to address international environmental
problems which can only be resolved through measures in con-
flict with the present rules of the General Agreement. 10 5
It is evident, however, that the Panel's decision has serious impli-
cations for both domestic and international environmental policy.
1. Unilateral Actions to Protect the Environment
A continuing theme of the Panel's decision is that GATT does
not allow unilateral imposition of trade measures to protect the
environment.' 0 While cooperative, multilateral environmental ef-
102. Id. para. 5.42.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 41-46.
104. Cf. GATT Panel Ruling, supra note 2, at 49-50, para. 5.42. The Panel elsewhere
suggests that a country can use tax policies to support environmental regulations. GATT
Panel Ruling, supra note 2, at 50, para. 6.2. This suggestion runs directly contrary to its
analysis of national treatment requirements in connection with the DPCIA.
105. Id. at 51, para. 6.4.
106. The Panel's conclusion that GATT may sanction only international environmental
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forts are certainly desirable, by themselves they may be insufficient
to prevent the destruction of critical environmental resources.10 7
Besides, a number of factors work against the success of multilat-
eral actions. For instance, parties often have an economic incentive
not to cooperate with others to preserve common resources such as
fisheries. 08 Diplomatic considerations can stand in the way of mu-
tual cooperation. 09 The shear number of parties involved can
make progress slow or impossible." 0 Finally, the long delays inci-
dent to creating the necessary consensus for multilateral coopera-
tion may prevent an effective response to a rapidly developing en-
vironmental crisis."' Often, "[u]nilateral action may be the only
feasible alternative to inaction." 112
The dolphin case itself demonstrates the difficulty of achieving
international consensus in order to conserve common resources.
Since 1976, the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission
(IATTC)," 3 largely at the behest of the United States, has at-
tempted to address dolphin mortality due to tuna fishing."' De-
spite these efforts, the IATTC is struggling to achieve the goals of
its dolphin conservation program."' It was not until 1986 that all
agreements is clearly at odds with the drafting history of GATT, especially Article XX(g).
See Charnovitz, supra note 50, at 54.
107. See, e.g., Mathews, supra note 33, at A21 ("Trade measures are often the only
means short of a multilateral treaty to influence the behavior of other countries. Even
within a broad treaty, trade sanctions are an effective tool to discourage free riders, coun-
tries that would like to enjoy a treaty's benefits without conforming to its requirements.").
108. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-International Environmental Law, 104
HARV. L. REV. 1484, 1569-70 (1991); Robert W. Hahn & Kenneth R. Richards, The Interna-
tionalization of Environmental Regulation, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 421, 429-30 (1989); Richard
B. Bilder, The Role of Unilateral State Action in Preventing International Environmental
Injury, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 51, 80 (1981).
109. Hahn & Richards, supra note 108, at 435. Such problems have occurred with the
enforcement of international whaling agreements. The friction that can develop over what
many leaders view as a minor issue is often seen more as an irritant than anything else.
Consequently, nations are reluctant to criticize one another's violations of such conventions.
See Dean M. Wilkinson, The Use of Domestic Measures to Enforce International Whaling
Agreements: A Critical Perspective, 17 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 271, 286 (1989).
110. Hahn & Richards, supra note 108, at 437.
111. See Bilder, supra note 108, at 90-91.
112. Id. at 95.
113. The IATTC was created in 1949 under an agreement between the United States
and Costa Rica. See IATTC Convention, supra note 78. Current members are Costa Rica,
France, Japan, Nicaragua, Panama, the United States, and Vanuatu. Mexico withdrew from
the IATTC in 1980. FIRST SU3MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 30, at 10-11 & nn.
21-23.
114. Steiner, supra note 6, at 20-21.
115. Telephone Interview with David Phillips, Executive Director, Earth Island Insti-
tute (Nov. 15, 1991). Congress has instructed the Administration to continue to seek multi-
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nations involved in the purse seine fishery on the ETP participated
in the program.' 6 In 1990, the IATTC governments agreed to es-
tablish a program aimed at significantly reducing dolphin mortal-
ity in the purse seine fishery, with the ultimate aim of eliminating
dolphin mortality. While all the other member nations of the
IATTC have joined in this program, Mexico refuses to partici-
pate.117 As a result of the inability to reach a cooperative interna-
tional solution, there seems little choice but for the United States
to pursue unilateral actions to prevent dolphin deaths, particularly
since the populations of certain species of dolphins are dangerously
depleted."'
Unilateral actions have been essential for success in many
other areas of environmental protection. For instance, it is doubt-
ful that the International Whaling Convention (IWC)" 9 would ever
have succeeded if the United States had not threatened to apply
trade sanctions to countries that refused to comply with IWC con-
servation restrictions. 2 ' Yet the interpretation of the Panel in the
present case implies that the threatened U.S. embargo was clearly
illegal under GATT. The embargo would have applied to fisheries
products rather than to whaling products, since whaling products
have not been imported into the United States for many years.
lateral solutions to the problem of dolphin deaths in the ETP fishery. DPCIA, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1385(h) (Supp. 1991).
116. FIRST SUBMISSION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 30, at 11. Until 1986, Mexico
refused to participate in the IATTC's observer program. Therefore, 1986 was the first year
when, IATTC observers were placed on all purse seine vessels and, consequently, the first
year that reliable estimates of dolphin mortality in the Eastern Tropical Pacific tuna fishery
were available. These figures were extremely disturbing, revealing that more than 133,000
dolphins died in this fishery in 1986, more than three times the average estimated for the
years 1979-85. Id. at 11-12.
117. FIRST SUBMISSION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 30, at 12 n.25.
118. Three dolphin species are primarily affected by the tuna fishery in the Eastern
Tropical Pacific, the common dolphin (Delphinus delphus), the spotted dolphin (Stenella
attenueta), and the spinner dolphin (Stenella longirostris). All are listed in Appendix II of
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
which includes species that may be threatened if trade is not restricted. See Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27
U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES]. For a detailed discus-
sion of CITES, see infra notes 131-135 and accompanying text. The MMPA includes spe-
cific restrictions designed to protect the spotted and spinner dolphins, the two most
threatened species. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii)(III) (Supp. 1991).
119. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat.
1716, T.I.A.S. No., 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 (entered into force Nov. 10, 1948).
120. See Arden-Clarke, supra note 33, at 18; see also Martin & Brennan, supra note 19,
at 314-15; Philippe J. Sands, The Environment, Community and International Law, 30
HARV. INT'L L.J. 393, 409 n.76 (1989).
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Under the Panel's ruling, the embargo would have been illegal be-
cause it both treated like products differently and was aimed at
protecting resources outside of U.S. jurisdiction. This is particu-
larly disturbing because the enforcement mechanisms of the IWC
are very similar to many other international environmental
agreements. 1
Further, unilateral action is also an important catalyst for in-
ternational action. Such actions taken by the United States have
helped force cooperative action in many other areas, such as the
international protection of endangered species protection and the
international regulation of oil spills. 122
2. Multilateral Environmental Protection Measures
It is difficult to square the Panel's narrow readings of Article
XX with many international environmental agreements that regu-
late environmentally destructive products or impose trade sanc-
tions against violators of agreements that protect common re-
sources like ocean fisheries. Without effective trade measures, it
will be difficult, if not impossible, for those treaties to achieve
meaningful results. The following examples illustrate the problem.
a. The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the
Ozone Layer
The Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone
Layer '2 represents a concerted international effort to stop deple-
tion of the earth's protective ozone layer by chlorine-based indus-
121. See Wilkinson, supra note 109, at 275-77.
122. Bilder, supra note 108, at 82. The European Community recently announced new
unilateral measures to restrict trade in endangered species products. EC Proposes Controls
on Wildlife Trade, J. COM., Nov. 15, 1991 at 5A.
123. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26
I.L.M. 1550 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. The Montreal
Protocol seeks to protect the ozone layer by calling for global regulation of substances that
deplete it. Id. at 1551. Forty-seven countries signed the Final Act of the Protocol. Id. at
1541. For in-depth analysis of the Montreal Protocol, see Elizabeth P. Barrett-Brown, Com-
ment, Building a Monitoring and Compliance Regime Under the Montreal Protocol, 16
YALE J. INT'L L. 519 (1991); Dale S. Bryk, Comment, The Montreal Protocol and Recent
Developments to Protect the Ozone Layer, 15 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 275 (1991); Annette M.
Capretta, Comment, The Future's So Bright, I Gotta Wear Shades: Future Impacts of the
Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 211
(1988).
[Vol. 23:2
1991-92] ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 597
trial chemicals such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)."2 4 Under the
Protocol, the international community has agreed to completely
phase out ozone-depleting chemicals by controlling their produc-
tion and consumption. 12 5
The GATT Panel ruling threatens at least two key aspects of
the Montreal Protocol. First, it undermines the critical provisions
of the Protocol authorizing trade embargoes against non-parties to
prevent them from obtaining ozone-depleting technologies and
from exporting ozone-depleting chemicals into countries that have
agreed to phase such chemicals out under the treaty.' 2  These
sanctions are essential to the success of the treaty because they
prevent "free riders," countries which would have an increased in-
centive to produce ozone-depleting chemicals for sale in member
countries where the phase-out of such chemicals is likely to create
a tight market and therefore increase prices for these chemicals.
1 27
Yet these provisions are illegal under the Panel's reasoning be-
cause they are aimed at protecting the ozone layer, which falls
outside of the jurisdiction of any country. Further, non-parties to
124. The ozone layer, located in the stratosphere, shields the earth from harmful solar
ultraviolet radiation that can cause skin cancer, eye cataracts, and crop damage. CFCs and
related chlorine-based substances act as catalysts, causing the decomposition of ozone mole-
cules, thinning the ozone layer, and thereby allowing more ultraviolet radiation to reach the
earth's surface. See Michael David Ehrenstein, Comment, A Moralistic Approach to the
Ozone Depletion Crisis, 21 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 611, 615-17 (1990). Recent studies
have demonstrated that the ozone layer is disappearing more rapidly than previously be-
lieved and that ozone depletion is now occurring over populated areas of the northern hemi-
sphere. Kathy Sawyer, Ozone-Hole Conditions Spreading: High Concentrations of Key Pol-
lutants Discovered Over U.S., WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1992, at Al; William K. Stevens,
Summertime Harm to Shield of Ozone Detected over U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1991, at 1A.
These studies suggest the need for even more drastic action than currently provided for
under the Montreal Protocol. See Bob Davis & Barbara Rosewicz, Panel Sees Ozone Thin-
ning, Intensifying Political Heat, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 1991, at B1. Recently, the Bush
administration supported action to speed up the phase out of ozone-depleting chemicals. In
an amendment to the energy bill, the U.S. Senate declared that ozone depletion is occurring
at twice the rate previously believed and proposed to cease production of the chemicals as
fast as possible. Philip J. Hilts, Senate Backs Faster Protection of Ozone Layer as Bush
Relents, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1992, at Al.
125. Parties are required to freeze and eventually phase out their production of CFCs
and related chemicals. Montreal Protocol, supra note 123, art. 2.
126. Id. art. 4, para. 1.
127. If non-parties increase their production of ozone-depleting chemicals, the signifi-
cant investment of many firms in alternative technologies could be severely undercut. In
Florida, Petroferm, a privately held specialty chemical company developed a solvent to
clean printed circuitboards which is produced from extractions from citrus fruit rinds. Also,
DuPont has its company scientists searching for substitute solvents in the electronics indus-
try which are less destructive to the stratospheric ozone. See Stuart Gannes, A Down-to-
Earth Job: Saving the Sky, FORTUNE, Mar. 14, 1988, at 133.
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the Montreal Protocol could not reasonably be said to have waived
their rights under GATT because they are not parties to the Mon-
treal Protocol. Thus, the Panel's attempt to exclude multilateral
environmental agreements where the parties have agreed to waive
their GATT rights from the scope of its opinion12 does not save
this provision and represents a serious threat to the Montreal Pro-
tocol. If non-party nations cannot be stopped from exporting
ozone-depleting chemicals, the Protocol is, for all intents and pur-
poses, unworkable.
A second critical feature of the Montreal Protocol is also
threatened by the Panel Ruling. The Protocol considers banning
trade in products produced with ozone-depleting chemicals but not
directly containing such chemicals. 129 Under the Panel's reasoning,
this provision may violate GATT because it would require govern-
ments to distinguish between otherwise identical products based
upon the production method used to create them-that is, whether
or not ozone-depleting chemicals were used. 3 ° The Panel inter-
prets Article III so that it prohibits such distinctions based upon
methods of production.
b. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Flora and Fauna
The Panel ruling also undermines efforts to restrict interna-
tional trade in endangered species and endangered species prod-
ucts. The cornerstone of international efforts to preserve endan-
gered species is the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).' CITES
128. GATT Panel Ruling, supra note 2, at 51, para. 6.3. In fact, GATT rights are al-
most never explicitly mentioned in international environmental agreements, suggesting that
the Panel's attempt to limit the scope of its ruling with respect to such agreements may
have little meaning.
129. Montreal Protocol, supra note 123, art. 4, para. 4. For instance, CFCs are used
extensively in the production of electronic goods to clean debris and excess solder off silicon
chips and printed circuitboards which go into computers, telephones, and hundreds of other
consumer products. Gannes, supra note 127, at 133.
130. See Arden-Clarke, supra note 33, at 29 ("Yet the ability to differentiate between
traded products on the basis of production methods is crucial if sustainable, environmen-
tally sound production techniques are to be introduced around the world.").
131. CITES, supra note 118. Over a hundred countries are signatories to CITES.
CITES regulates the international trade of wild animals and plants which are listed in
the three appendices to the Convention. The treaty prohibits the commercial trade of spe-
cies listed in Appendix I, those that are threatened with extinction. It also provides for
controlled international trade of Appendix II species, those whose survival is not yet
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contains severe restrictions on trade in endangered species prod-
ucts, including import and export restrictions and requirements
that the importing country, as with the MMPA, satisfy itself that
an effective program to prevent extinction of the species in ques-
tion is in place in the exporting country. 132 Just like the Montreal
Protocol, CITES imposes restrictions on trade with non-party
states.133 Because CITES generally protects wildlife resources that
are outside the jurisdiction of the nation restricting the trade of
those resources, it runs contrary to the Panel's interpretation of
GATT."" Further, because many CITES restrictions are aimed at
ensuring that any harvest of wildlife species takes place only in a
manner which will allow for the preservation of the species such
CITES-based restrictions would run afoul of the Panel ruling be-
cause they differentiate between like wildlife products based upon
their method of production. 35
IV. REFORMING THE GATT
The World Commission on Environment and Development
called for environmental reforms of GATT, stating that GATT will
have to "reflect concern for the impacts of trading patterns on the
environment, and the need for more effective instruments to inte-
grate environment and development concerns into international
trading arrangements."'' 3 This statement underscores the need to
threatened but may become so without intervention and monitoring. Species in Appendix
III, those whose trade must be controlled in order to support domestic conservation pro-
grams, are subject to export permits and export restrictions under CITES. SIMON LYSTER,
INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 240-41 (1985). An elaborate and detailed discussion of CITES
is provided in DAVID S, FAVRE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES: A GUIDE TO
CITES (1989).
132. CITES, supra note 118, arts. III-V.
133. Id. art. X.
134. See supra text accompanying note 128. Moreover, as with the Montreal Protocol,
CITES contains no language expressing an intention to reconcile GATT provisions.
135. For example, CITES often will allow international commerce in animals or animal
products from endangered species if the species is raised domestically but not taken from
the wild, as is the case with animals bred in captivity. CITES, supra note 118, art. VII(4),
(5).
136. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE
(1987), quoted in, Arden-Clarke, supra note 33, at 4. The Panel Ruling also called for re-
form of GATT, at least by implication:
It seemed evident to the Panel that, if the CONTRACTING PARTIES were to
permit import restrictions in response to differences in environmental policies
under the General Agreement, they would need to impose limits on the range of
policy differences justifying such responses and to develop criteria so as to pre-
vent abuse. If the CONTRACTING PARTIES were to decide to permit trade
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reform GATT so that it meets environmental objectives. 137 The
measures of this type in particular circumstances it would therefore be prefera-
ble for them to do so not by interpreting Article XX, but by amending or sup-
plementing the provisions of the General Agreement or waiving obligations
thereunder.
GATT Panel Ruling, supra note 2, at 51, para. 6.3.
137. Several organizations have already begun to work on environmental reforms of
GATT, opening up several avenues for the implementation of such reforms. These include:
the GATT Working Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade, see Wil-
liam Dullforce, GATT Revives Its Working Group on Environment, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 9,
1991, at 3; a project sponsored by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment, see Joint Report on Trade and Environment, Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development [OECD], Doc. COM/ENV/EC/TD(91)14/REV2 (May 14, 1991); a study
by the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, see Informal Encounter on Interna-
tional Trade and the Environment, U.N. Conference on Trade and Development
[UNCTAD], (Feb. 28-Mar. 1, 1991); and recent calls for a GATT Environmental Code to be
developed as part of a future "Green Round" of GATT negotiations. 137 CONG. REc. S13169,
13169-70 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1991)(statement of Sen. Baucus) [hereinafter Baucus speech].
An examination of the history of the GATT Working Group illustrates both the reluc-
tance of GATT to deal with environmental problems and the perils that may await negotia-
tors attempting to enact the kind of reforms to GATT proposed here. The working group
was formed in response to Recommendation Number 103 of the Stockholm Conference on
Human Environment, which suggested that GATT examine the problems of countries in-
voking " 'environmental concerns as a pretext for discriminatory trade policies or for re-
duced access to markets'...." Initially set up in 1971, the GATT Working Group was
established "to examine, upon request, any specific matters relevant to the trade policy as-
pects of measures to control pollution and protect human environment, especially with re-
gard to the application of the provisions of the General Agreement taking into account the
particular problems of developing countries." GATT and the Environment: A Chronology,
78 GATT Focus 3, 5 (1991). However, in the twenty years since it was chartered, the Group
has never met. Patterson, supra note 37, at 10,603-04 n.44.
Recently, in connection with the ongoing Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, the
European Free Trade Association (which comprises Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Swe-
den, and Switzerland) strongly endorsed reactivation of the working group. On October 8,
1991, provisional terms of reference were drawn up directing the group to examine existing
multilateral environmental agreements and their consistency with GATT rules, the interna-
tional trade consequences and transparency effects of individual national environment regu-
lations and the trade effects of new packaging and labelling rules designed to protect the
environment. Dullforce, supra at 3.
Two factors suggest that the Working Group may not succeed in implementing signifi-
cant environmental reforms. First, the Group's terms of reference appear to be aimed at
examining how environmental regulation may impinge upon free trade. Recommendation
Number 103 of the Stockholm Conference suggested that the GATT group on the environ-
ment be used to examine problems of countries "[invoking] environmental concerns as a
pretext for discriminatory trade policies or for reduced access to markets .. " GATT and
the Environment: A Chronology, supra at 5. While this is an important issue, it does not
address the reforms called for here, which would examine the inverse question, how free
trade rules hamper legitimate efforts to protect the environment. Second, developing coun-
tries, who fear environmental rules will be used to exclude their products from the markets
of the industrialized countries, are reluctant to endorse environmentally-related trade mea-
sures. Chakravarthi Raghavan, Environment: Twenty Year Wait for First GATT Working
Group Meet, Inter Press Service, Oct. 8, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
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following discussion is meant to illustrate the need for adoption of
both procedural and substantive reforms.
A. Rejecting the GATT Panel Ruling
The GATT dispute resolution system, at least as currently
conceived, is based upon the concept of consensus among the Con-
tracting Parties. 3 ' Because of the potential effects discussed
above, it seems unlikely that a consensus will develop that adheres
to the Panel's interpretation. Affirmative rejection of the Panel's
interpretation of GATT is growing in the U.S. Congress, which ref-
uses to implement any changes to the MMPA 139 and has begun to
develop legislation that would limit or reverse the Panel's interpre-
tation.'4" A similar consensus seems to be developing in other
countries as well.14 '
Although it is an extremely unusual step, the GATT Council
should reject the Panel's decision on the grounds that it was
wrongly decided. 4 ' If it is to retain its credibility, the GATT
138. See LONG, supra note 32, at 76; Mid-Term Review, supra note 27, at 11-12 ("The
practice of adopting panel reports by consensus shall be continued.").
139. Letter from Senator Bob Packwood, et al., to President George Bush (Oct. 3, 1991)
(letter signed by 63 Senators expressing "serious misgivings" about Panel Ruling); Letter
from Rep. Barbara Boxer, et al., to President George Bush (Sept. 18, 1991) (letter from 100
members of the House of Representatives criticizing Panel Ruling and pledging "we will not
support any attempt to repeal legislation called into question by the recent ruling").
140. See Baucus speech, supra note 137, at 13169-70; Merchant Marine Panel Devel-
ops Bill on GATT Changes to Protect Environment, Daily Rep. for Executives, (BNA) No.
189, at A-11 (Sept. 30, 1991). The decision has also been sharply criticized by environmental
groups from around the world. See, e.g., Arden-Clarke, supra note 33, at 29 (European cri-
tique of decision); Homero Aridjis, Defending Dolphins, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1991, at A17
(Mexican critique); Environmental Group Says GATT Tuna Report Could Have Disas-
trous Conservation Impact, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (Sept. 13, 1991), available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library ; Groups Call for Environmental Clauses in North American Free Trade
Agreement, Int'l Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 497 (Sept. 11, 1991); Mathews, supra note 33,
at A21. There is a danger that, unless GATT responds to these criticisms, its legitimacy as
an institution will be undermined.
141. The European Free Trade Association, for example, has called for GATT to ad-
dress environmental issues. See supra note 137. Similarly, Sweden has stated that trade
implications of environmental issues are a "fairly urgent" issue and that trade-policy consid-
erations must be introduced into environmental discussion. Environment and Trade, 77
GATT Focus 6 (1990). Austria, the European Community, Chile, the ASEAN countries, and
Nigeria all agree that environmental protection is a global issue which should be acknowl-
edged in the GATT. Several Countries Urge Quick Start to GATT Environment Work, 80
GATT Focus 9, 9-10 (1991).
142. No panel report has ever been rejected by the GATT Council. LONG, supra note
32, at 77. However, in several cases, the Council has failed to adopt reports. Personal Com-
munication with Steve Charnovitz, International Trade Consultant (Nov. 20, 1991). Addi-
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Council should reject panel rulings, like the one considered here,
that reach improper conclusions or that do not reflect a consensus
among the Contracting Parties. 14 3 One business publication re-
cently editorialized, "If the GATT panel's finding is adopted, amid
international and domestic uproar over dolphin safety, the GATT's
reputation as an out-of-step, bureaucratic organization with trade
blinders on, justified or not, will grow. . . . Neither [President]
Bush nor GATT officials can afford to ignore these political
realities."'""
B. Procedural Reforms of GATT
1. Limiting GATT's Jurisdiction over Environmental Disputes
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is the principal
international agreement which regulates trade.'4 5 Its historical role
and institutional expertise are confined to identifying and reducing
barriers to trade." ' GATT lacks both the expertise and the institu-
tional strength to become an arbiter of international environmen-
tal disputes.147  Therefore, in environmental disputes, GATT
tionally, there remains considerable doubt about whether the United States and Mexico will
bring the Panel Ruling before the GATT Council. See supra note 33 and accompanying
text. The Panel Ruling will have no legal effect if it is not adopted by the GATT Council.
Davey, supra note 32, at 60. Even if the Panel Report is not adopted, two reasons suggest
that the problems described here will remain. First, even unadopted reports still influence
GATT policy. Secondly, the report reflects fundamental deficiencies in the GATT system.
Arden-Clarke, supra note 33, at 30.
143. Davey, supra note 32, at 76 n. 99. This is particularly true if, as expected, the
Uruguay Round negotiations result in GATT moving toward a system based upon the con-
cept of legally binding panel decisions rather than upon consensus adoption of decisions.
See William J. Davey, Remarks, 84 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROCEEDINGS 135, 136 (1990) (concern-
ing trends in Uruguay Round negotiations with respect to dispute settlement).
144. Editorial, supra note 79, at 8A; see also Charnovitz, supra note 50, at 55.
145. Davey, supra note 57, at 7.
146. Id.
147. "GATT does not have the scientific expertise to judge what ecological measures
are appropriate. ... [Elnvironmental policy would be too divisive for GATT's current deci-
sion-making structure." Charnovitz, supra note 50, at 55. In order for an individual to be
eligible for membership on a GATT panel, the country proposing his membership must
demonstrate only that he has "knowledge of international trade and of the GATT." Mid-
Term Review, supra note 27, at 10 (specifying the dispute settlement procedures under
which the Contracting Parties now operate). There is no requirement that panel members
demonstrate any expertise related to environmental policy or expertise concerning any other
issues that might be collaterally involved in a trade dispute. As a result, "Dispute Panels
have interest primarily, and expertise only, in the objective of liberalizing trade. Disputes
are settled on GATT technicalities, rather than on a close examination of the implications
for environment and natural resource conservation issues." Arden-Clarke, supra note 33, at
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should strictly limit its role to determining whether a challenged
trade measure is in fact a disguised protectionist measure. '""
There are several ways to ensure that GATT does not over-
reach with respect to environmental questions. First, where a trade
restriction is challenged as a GATT violation, the burden of proof
to demonstrate that the measure is a disguised barrier to trade
should be placed on the challenging party. Otherwise, legitimate
environmental protections may be ruled illegal, because, for in-
stance, the scientific evidence supporting a measure is not free
from scientific controversy, as is often the case with environmental
and human health matters. ' Second, governments enacting envi-
ronmental regulations should be entitled to reject alternative mea-
sures if they are too impractical, too costly, or unlikely to be
effective.1 50
Third, where decisions involve scientific or environmental ex-
pertise-such as whether a particular trade measure is well-tai-
lored to address a given environmental problem-GATT should
defer to established institutions with environmental expertise. 151
For example, where an issue involves trade in endangered species
products, the CITES Secretariat should be consulted. If a trade
dispute involves an issue not previously addressed by a specialized
21.
In this dispute, the panelists apparently lacked any environmental expertise. The
GATT Secretariat stated only that "the panelists were chosen for their good judgment and
familiarity with GATT polices." Telephone Interview with Amelia Porges, Legal Advisor's
Office, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Nov. 1, 1991).
Further, because panel members often are government officials in the employ of partic-
ular countries, they are likely to be concerned about how a particular dispute could affect
their country. Therefore, there is significant doubt that they can b e neutral arbiters of dis-
putes. Davey, supra note 32, at 88-89. This is likely to be particularly true with environmen-
tal disputes because environmental problems are ubiquitous and nearly every government is
therefore likely to have an economic stake in the outcome of disputes involving these issues.
148. Charnovitz, supra note 50, at 55.
149. See David A. Wirth, American Environmental Law and the International Legal
System, 42-46 (1991) (manuscript to be published in VIRGINIA J. INT'L L.).
150. The current interpretation of the term "necessary" in Article XX(b) has been crit-
icized because it severely restricts the choices governments can make among various alterna-
tive policies when seeking to attain a given environmental objective. See supra notes 77-83
and accompanying text.
151. This suggestion is not alien to the GATT framework. A similar process has been
incorporated into the current draft of the proposed GATT code on sanitary and phytosani-
tary measures. In disputes involving such measures, the draft code provides that the scien-
tific basis of a trade measure must be examined to determine if a legitimate basis for gov-
ernment concern exists. In order to address these scientific questions, a panel of scientific
experts is incorporated into the dispute resolution process. Text on Measures, supra note
68, para. 37.
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international body such as CITES, GATT should consult organiza-
tions like the United Nations Environmental Programme,"'2 which
has more generalized expertise in environmental issues.
Another body that could judge the validity of claims concern-
ing environmental issues in trade disputes is the International
Court for the Environment. An international conference recently
proposed such a court within the United Nations system in order
to efficiently settle international environmental disputes.153 The
proponents of this court envision it as a permanent, international
authority that will support compulsory and efficient resolution of
conflicts concerning environmental policy. 54
2. Increasing Public Involvement in GATT Decisions
As the Mexican tuna dispute illustrates, GATT operates in a
near-total vacuum, with participation limited primarily to the gov-
ernments of the Contracting Parties. 5' Especially where important
issues of public policy are concerned, the exclusion of interested
non-governmental parties (such as environmental organizations)
seriously undermines GATT's perceived legitimacy.156 The exclu-
sion of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also frustrates ef-
152. See generally Lynton Keith Caldwell, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:
EMERGENCE AND DIMENSIONS 63-75 (1984)(discussing UNEP). If a less formal procedure is
required, the parties to a disputte might also refer environmental questions to Environmen-
tal Mediation International (EMI) which was established in 1978 to facilitate the use of
mediation and related techniques in settling environmental and natural resource disputes.
See generally Robert E. Stein, The Settlement of Environmental Disputes: Towards a Sys-
tem of Flexible Dispute Settlement, 12 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 283 (1985).
153. See generally The Honorable Amedeo Postiglione, A More Efficient International
Law on the Environment and Setting Up an International Court for the Environment
Within the United Nations, 20 ENVTL. L. 321 (1990). Twenty-seven countries participated
in the international Congress that called for creation of an International Court for the Envi-
ronment in April 1989. Id. at 321 (Editor's note). The Court would specialize in environmen-
tal issues and would be formed "in order to make individuals and States respect prevention
rules, as well as to force repair of ecological damage . Id. at 325.
154. Id. at 323.
155. See generally Thompson, supra note 57, at 7-9. The current rules concerning dis-
pute resolution specify that only the governments of the Contracting Parties involved in a
dispute and governments of Contracting Parties with a "substantial interest" in the dispute
can present their views to a dispute resolution panel. Mid-Term Review, supra note 27, at
10-11. Thus, GATT operates on the traditional theory that only national governments have
standing in international law and that the interests of individuals can adequately be repre-
sented by their governments. This theory is both questionable and largely outdated. Devel-
opments in the Law, supra note 108, at 1588; T. SUBRAMANYA, RIGHTS AND STATUS OF THE
INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 27-32 (1984).
156. See Developments in the Law, supra note 108, at 1601.
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forts to ensure that GATT will not stand in the way of the devel-
oping international law of environmental protection. 157
By contrast, increasing public participation in the GATT dis-
pute resolution process could significantly improve the quality of
GATT decision-making. Non-government actors can: provide criti-
cal information and unique expertise to GATT decision-makers;
make new information available to policy-makers as it develops;
protect the rights and interests of environmental, consumer, mi-
nority, and other groups that will otherwise be underrepresented in
the GATT process; and help support GATT decisions by a consen-
sus of Contracting Parties.15 8
Minor modifications to GATT procedures could greatly im-
prove its record of public participation. For instance, GATT cur-
rently allows interested Contracting Parties to intervene as third
parties in dispute resolution panel proceedings. 159 Public involve-
157. See Sands, supra note 120, at 401 ("In excluding these non-governmental organi-
zations from fuller participation in the affairs of international society, the international legal
system establishes a notion of community and participant which fails to reflect an important
reality and which lacks effectiveness. One consequence of this flawed structure is the inabil-
ity of traditional international law to give effect to a large number of peoples' expressed
desire for environmental protection.").
158. See, e.g., Arthur Earl Bonfield, Military and Foreign Affairs Function Rule-Mak-
ing Under the APA, 71 MICH. L. REV. 222, 222-23 (1972); Developments in the Law, supra
note 108, at 1601-02; Richard A. Frank, Public Participation in the Foreign Policy Process,
in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY, at 66, 71 (Francis 0. Wilcox &
Richard A. Frank eds., 1976); Sands, supra note 120, at 411-12; William D. Araiza, Note,
Notice-and-Comment Rights for Administrative Decisions Affecting International Trade:
Heightened Need, No Response, 99 YALE L. J. 669, 682-84 (1989) (discussing advantages of
public involvement in process of making U.S. government trade policy). In addition, partici-
pation by NGOs representing consumer interests could add legitimacy and political impetus
to GATT's mission of reducing tariffs and other trade barriers. See DAVISON, supra note 93,
at 17 (International Organization of Consumers Unions urges completion of Uruguay
Round).
159. The current rules for participation of Contracting Parties as third parties in the
resolution panels provide:
(e) Third Contracting Parties
1. The interests of the parties to a dispute and those of other contracting parties
shall be fully taken into account during the panel process.
2. Any third contracting party having a substantial interest in a matter before a
panel, and having notified this to the Council, shall have an opportunity to be
heard by the panel and to make written submissions to the panel. These submis-
sions shall also be given to the parties to the dispute and shall be reflected in the
panel report.
3. At the request of the third contracting party, the panel may grant the third
contracting party access to the written submissions to the panel by those parties
to the dispute which have agreed to the disclosure of their respective submis-
sions to the third contracting party.
Mid-Term Review, supra note 27, at 11.
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ment in the panel process could be achieved simply by allowing
interested non-governmental organizations to make written sub-
missions to the panel. 160 Further, GATT could grant NGOs the
right to participate directly in dispute panels, provided that some
mechanism is created to ensure that the panel is not overwhelmed
by multiple presentations. 61 In the broader context of GATT ne-
gotiations, it is feasible that public participation in the GATT pro-
cess would increase by, for example, granting NGOs status as ob-
servers, which would allow them to participate and comment on
GATT proceedings. e1
GATT already recognizes, in a limited way, the value of ad-
ministrative procedures that are open to parties interested in a
particular matter. For example, the draft Standards Code now be-
ing considered in the Uruguay Round would require a Contracting
160. See Developments in the Law, supra note 108, at 1602-03. To make this effective,
GATT would have to institute a system whereby NGOs could receive notice of impending
panel hearings. See id. at 1603-04. Such a system could be implemented easily by GATT's
existing public relations machinery which, for instance, publishes a monthly newsletter
called GATT Focus.
161. See, e.g., id. at 1588-89 (discussing ECOSOC system as an example of how NGOs
are classified and given participatory rights). However, the concern that public participation
will bog down the administrative process is generally overblown:
Some have suggested that allowing the public. . . to partake in the mechanisms
of government opens floodgates and creates an unmanageable process. This is
simply not so. Virtually all public segments or viewpoints do or can have repre-
sentatives or spokesmen, thus limiting the numbers who will ask to be heard.
Since the public now participates in analogous domestic issues without rendering
inefficient the decision-making process, it should be able to be similarly involved
in foreign affairs.
Frank, supra note 158, at 67.
162. See Sands, supra note 120, at 415. The concept of public participation in interna-
tional organizations is not a new one. NGOs play an important role in a number of interna-
tional environmental organizations, including the Montreal Protocol, CITES, and UNEP.
See Developments in the Law, supra note 108, at 1577, 1602. In both the European Com-
munity and the Nordic Community, NGOs have standing to challenge activities that violate
Community environmental standards and to seek redress against member governments.
Sands, supra note 120, at 413-15. Similarly, a number of international human rights organi-
zations allow individuals and NGOs to challenge government activities that violate human
rights norms. See, e.g., David Weissbrodt, The Contribution of International Nongovern-
mental Organizations to the Protection of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 403, 403-06 (Theodor Meron ed., 1985); Sands, supra
note 120, at 416-17. Through these procedures NGOs have successfully raised public con-
sciousness of human rights violations around the world and helped remedy these violations.
Id. Also, the International Labor Organisation institutionalizes NGO involvement in its tri-
partite structure by requiring each member country's delegation to include representatives
of workers organizations, employers organizations, and governments. Wirth, supra note 149,
at 8, n.19. See also LEONARD J. CALHOUN, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION AND
UNITED STATES DOMESTIC LAW 14 (1953)(discussing ILO).
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Party adopting a technical regulation to provide notice and an op-
portunity for comment to other Contracting Parties. ' There is no
principled reason to limit such procedural rights to governments or
to refuse to grant similar procedural rights in the GATT process
itself.16 4
3. Increasing Public Access to Information
Presently, access to information in the GATT system is strin-
gently controlled. This is demonstrated in that country submis-
sions to GATT panels are not revealed even to other GATT Con-
tracting Parties unless the country responsible for the submission
grants access to the submission.'1 5 If public participation in GATT
is to be effective, members of the public must have access to such
documents. GATT should therefore substantially modify its infor-
mation policy so that all documents are presumed to be publicly
available except for limited and clearly defined categories of infor-
mation where confidentiality is essential, including, for instance,
proprietary information, personnel records containing private in-
formation and information revealing a party's negotiating strategy
163. Technical Barriers to Trade, supra note 85, art. 2.9.4 (requiring Contracting Par-
ties to "allow reasonable time for other Parties to make comments in writing, discuss these
comments upon request, and take these written comments and the results of these discus-
sions into account.").
164. NGOs and members of the public also enjoy rights to participate in formulating
domestic processes for making international trade policy. Section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974 authorizes the President to retaliate against U.S. trading partners engaged in unfair
trading practices. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (Supp. 1991). It further allows affected members of the
public to bring complaints against foreign producers engaged in unfair practice and provides
for notice-and-comment rulemaking once a section 301 proceeding is underway. 19 U.S.C.
§ 2412(a)(1), (4) (Supp. 1991). One of the practices that may result in sanctions under sec-
tion 301 is the persistent denial of worker rights such as the right of association. 19 U.S.C.
§ 2411(d)(3)(B)(iii)(I). This may be a useful model to enforce internationally recognized
environmental standards or norms.
Similarly, the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act gives preferential trade status
to underdeveloped Caribbean nations. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706 (Supp. 1991). That Act also
provides that interested members of the public may file petitions seeking to revoke prefer-
ences that are injuring domestic concerns. 19 U.S.C. § 2703(f) (Supp. 1991). Once a revoca-
tion procedure is instituted, the public is entitled to participate in notice-and-comment
rulemaking procedures. 19 U.S.C. § 2702(e)(2)(B) (Supp. 1991). One of the grounds that
may justify revocation of preferences is the failure of the recipient country to follow "inter-
nationally recognized worker rights." 19 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(8) (Supp. 1991). Other examples of
trade policy that call for public participation include measures to prevent dumping, 19
U.S.C. § 2252 (Supp. 1991), and initiatives to open negotiations for trade agreements. 19
U.S.C. §§ 2153, 2155 (Supp. 1991).
165. See Mid-Term Review, supra note 27, at 11.
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before the negotiation has been completed. 6'
C. Substantive Reforms of the GATT to Achieve Environ-
mental Protection
1. Reforms to Allow Governments to Impose Measures to Protect
the Environment
Before the GATT Panel Ruling, some commentators believed
that Articles XX(b) and XX(g) would allow Contracting Parties to
impose trade measures aimed at protecting global resources like
the ozone layer and ocean fisheries. 11 7 The GATT Panel Ruling,
because it interprets Article XX so narrowly, seems to darken any
hope that the Article will allow such protective measures. There-
fore, Article XX, as well as several other GATT articles, must be
amended, either directly or through agreements such as the GATT
Standard on Technical Barriers to Trade, which promulgate rules
ensuring compliance with GATT requirements.
a. A New Article XX(k) 6 8
A new exception must be added to Article XX which would
allow trade sanctions "imposed for the protection of the environ-
ment, ecological or biological resources, consumers or animal wel-
fare, whether within or outside the jurisdiction of the Contracting
166. The Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. 1991), is
an apt model. See Frank, supra note 158, at 73-74. Other international institutions such as
the World Bank have recently revised information disclosure policies in an effort to become
more open to public involvement. The Bank's most recent policy, for instance, states that
"it is the Bank's policy to be open about its activities, and to welcome, and to seek out,
opportunities to explain its work to the widest audience possible." THE WORLD BANK AND
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, DIRECTIVE ON DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION at 1 (July
1989). Nonetheless, the Bank has been sharply criticized for failing to live up to its stated
goal of openness. See, e.g., Michael Prowse, IMF-World Bank's Culture of Secrecy At-
tacked, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1991, at 4 (World Bank's former chief economist, Professor
Stanley Fischer, attacks Bank's "culture of secrecy" in a public speech).
167. See, e.g., JEANNE J. GRIMMETT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION AND THE GATT 14-15, 21-24 (1991); Arden-Clarke, supra note 33, at 16 (sug-
gesting Article XX(b) "is potentially effective as an environmental safeguard, depending on
its interpretation.").
168. The GATT Contracting Parties could achieve the results of the new Article XX(k)
proposed here by modifying agreements currently under negotiation in the Uruguay Round
to reflect the concerns expressed herein. For instance, the Agreement on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures is intended to elaborate requirements for complying with Article
XX(b). See generally Text on Measures, supra note 68.
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Party enacting the measure."'' 9 This language would unequivocally
protect governmental efforts to impose trade restrictions designed
to prevent the destruction of the environment, provided they are
not disguised trade restrictions imposed in violation of the pream-
ble of Article XX. The exception would not be confined to protect-
ing resources within the jurisdiction of the country imposing the
restrictions, but would allow protection of such resources regard-
less of whether they are within or without a given country's
borders.
b. Article XX(h)
Article XX(h) permits the enforcement of measures "under-
taken in pursuance of obligations under [any] intergovernmental
commodity agreement.'17 0 New language should be added to the
end of this Article to allow trade measures undertaken in compli-
ance with or to enforce international conservation or environmen-
tal protection agreements.17 ' This language would protect the trade
sanctions provided for under international agreements like the
Montreal Protocol and conservation agreements such as CITES.
Within the international community, ensuring the implementation
and enforcement of a treaty is a significant concern.172 Where na-
tions reach a consensus regarding regulation of national conduct in
order to achieve agreed-upon environmental objectives, trade re-
strictions should be available to enforce compliance and prevent
free riders from undermining the effectiveness of the agreed-upon
system.173 The amendment to Article XX(h) proposed here would
ensure that such international agreements can be carried out con-
sistently with GATT.
169. Charles Arden-Clarke proposes a slightly different formulation for the new Article
XX(k): "(k) designed, whether by way of precaution or remedial measures, to encourage or
ensure protection of environment and promote sustainable development." Arden-Clarke,
supra note 33, at 7; see also Patterson, supra note 37, at 10,602-03.
170. GATT, supra note 1, art. XX(h).
171. Article XX(h) would then read:
(h) undertaken in pursuance of obligations under any intergovernmental com-
modity agreement which conforms to criteria submitted to the Contracting Par-
ties and not disapproved by them or which is itself so submitted and not so
disapproved, or in pursuance of any intergovernmental environmental or re-
source conservation agreement provided that the Contracting Parties are pro-
vided notice of such agreement.






Article XI outlaws quantitative restrictions on either imports
or exports. A limited exception allows restrictions preventing criti-
cal shortages of food or other products essential to a particular
country. A second exception should be added permitting quantita-
tive restrictions to prevent depletion of critical global or national
natural resources. This new exception would allow, for instance,
tropical countries to impose restrictions on the export of un-
processed timber in order to encourage domestic value-added tim-
ber processing, thereby reducing demand for tropical timber pro-
duction.174 Similarly, countries that import tropical timber could
take measures to promote the sustainable development of tropical
forests by limiting or phasing out imports of unsustainably pro-
duced timber.17 5
2. Allowing Measures to Encourage Sustainable Development
The reforms proposed above merely eliminate the unaccept-
able restrictions imposed upon environmental policy by the Panel's
strained interpretation of GATT. In addition, GATT should, be
reformed to affirmatively encourage sustainable development by
providing incentives for industries to reduce the environmental im-
pacts of their operations to the greatest extent possible. Unfortu-
nately, as currently carried out, international trade promotes ex-
actly the opposite result: those industries that invest in pollution
control are placed at a competitive disadvantage compared to in-
dustries that are allowed to externalize environmental costs be-
cause GATT does not allow governments to distinguish between
like products of these industries. 176 GATT reforms to encourage
174. Several tropical countries, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, have imposed
bans or quotas on the export of raw logs as a measure to conserve their rapidly-dwindling
forest resources. Under GATT as currently interpreted, these restrictions would likely fall if
challenged by tropical timber importing countries. Arden-Clarke, supra note 33, at 14-15.
The United States has enacted similar restrictions on exports of raw timber in order to
conserve its ancient forests. See Forest Resources Conservation and Shortage Relief Act of
1990, 16 U.S.C. §§ 620-620j (Supp. 1991).
175. Arden-Clarke, supra note 33, at 15-16.
176. [A] country wishing to maintain stringent environmental standards without
impairing the trade competitiveness of its domestic industry has two options:
a. impose import tariffs to offset domestic pollution control costs [or]
b. underwrite domestic pollution control with subsidies raised from gen-
eral revenues.
In the absence of such trade measures, the higher short-term economic costs
[Vol. 23:2
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environmental protection could take at least two forms.
First, GATT should create a mechanism that would advocate
internalization of environmental costs. One possibility is for GATT
to grant importing countries the right to impose a duty upon im-
ported products equal to the costs avoided when the manufacturer
failed to comply with pollution control laws.17 Similarly, GATT
could allow exporting countries the option to subsidize their indus-
tries to the extent that strict pollution control laws put those in-
dustries at a competitive disadvantage with uncontrolled industries
in other countries.17
8
Second, GATT should authorize governments to offer prefer-
ential treatment to environmentally friendly products. 179 For ex-
ample, GATT should provide preferences to products produced
with the best available pollution control technology or resources
(like timber) that are extracted in a sustainable manner. GATT
already allows preferential treatment of the products of developing
countries, a policy aimed at encouraging their development.18 0 This
policy could easily be extended to accord different and more
favorable treatment to environmentally friendly products. 81 Thus,
industrialized countries would be authorized to offer different and
associated with some environmentally clean and/or sustainable production
processes, would place goods produced with such practices at a competitive dis-
advan-tage [sic]. This would discourage widespread introduction of these
practices.
Both options listed above are currently at odds with GATT, which explicitly
limits the right of governments to impose tariffs or quantitative restrictions that
discriminate on this basis, and prohibits the use of certain subsidies.
Arden-Clarke, supra note 33, at 12; see also Patterson, supra note 37, at 10600.
177. This duty would operate in much the same way as anti-dumping measures. GATT
allows Contracting Parties to impose countervailing duties where their markets are flooded
by subsidized imports. See Patterson, supra note 37, at 10602.
178. Such a provision could easily be included in the existing GATT Subsidies Code.
179. See Patterson, supra note 37, at 10603. Preference should be available only to
businesses from developing countries. Industries from the industrialized world generally al-
ready are subject to regulations requiring the best available pollution control technology.
Governments in the developed world should require industries based in their countries to
comply with the same standards when investing overseas. See Developments in the Law,
supra note 108, at 1609-12; see generally Alan Neff, Not in Their Backyards, Either: A
Proposal for a Foreign Environmental Practices Act, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 477 (1990).
180. See GATT, supra note 1, pt. IV, arts. XXXVI-XXXVIII; see also LONG, supra
note 32, at 89-94.
181. Examples of different and more favorable treatment accorded to the products of
developing countries by the United States include the Caribbean Basin Initiative, which
offers reduced tariffs to the products of poor Caribbean countries, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706
(Supp. 1991), and the Generalized System of Preferences. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2466 (Supp.
1991).
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more favorable trade treatment to products that meet require-
ments for best available control technology or sustainable resource
production, as defined by international organizations with environ-
mental expertise such as UNEP or the International Tropical Tim-
ber Organization. Favorable treatment should be combined with a
program to improve transfer of environmental protection technol-
ogy, so that developing countries can readily attain the necessary
standards.182
V. CONCLUSION
The GATT Panel decision on imports of tuna from Mexico
narrowly limits the use of trade sanctions to enforce international
environmental agreements. This decision seriously undermines ef-
forts to protect not only marine mammals, but also critical re-
sources such as the ozone layer, endangered species, and tropical
forests. The Panel's narrow interpretations of GATT Articles,
which permit the protection of biological resources and for the con-
servation of natural resources, are at odds with both the plain lan-
guage of the Agreement and its drafting history. The GATT Coun-
cil should reject the decision as wrongly decided by the dispute
panel. In addition, GATT should immediately begin a process of
reform so that environmental values are incorporated into the in-
ternational trading system.
182. This proposal might augment a larger program of technology transfer, see Haig
Simonian, Gap Needs Bridging, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1991, at 20 (plan for fund to help trans-
fer environmental technology to the developing world), perhaps as part of a larger "grand
bargain," in which the industrialized world assists the developing countries in achieving
agreed-upon environmental goals. See, e.g., Williamson, iupra note 42, at 750-51.
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